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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal and cross appeal are taken pursuant to Rule 4 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure seeking review of the Order 
and Judgment of the Seventh Judicial District Court of Emery County 
dated November 30, 1992. This cross appeal is taken pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(f) and (j) (1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented on this appeal and cross-appeal are: 
1. Whether the Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of 
marshalling the evidence and showing that the findings of fact 
entered by the trial court are clearly erroneous. 
2. Whether the trial court was correct in finding that the 
royalty rate called for by the State coal lease held by Plaintiff 
was 8% of value. 
3. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to apply the 
interest rate and late fee penalties prescribed by the rules and 
regulations of the Board of State Lands and Forestry to the 
delinquent royalties owed by Plaintiff. 
4. Whether the trial court ruled correctly that Plaintiff 
must pay to the State the royalty called for in a state coal lease 
on coal Plaintiff mined, sold, and was paid for, before Plaintiff 
submitted the assignment of its lease for approval to the Division 
of State Lands and Forestry. 
5. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the statute 
of limitations does not prevent the State as trustee of school 
trust lands from collecting full value for coal mined and sold by 
Plaintiff under the state coal lease. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The arguments raised by Plaintiff are premised on a version of 
facts different from the facts found by the trial court. This case 
involves the interpretation of a state coal lease on which the 
court received extrinsic evidence regarding the prevailing royalty 
rate paid by lessees on coal leases issued by the United States, 
the intent of the parties, and the interpretation of the royalty 
clause in the state lease. In such a case the standard of review 
is strictly limited to whether, after marshalling all of the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings, the findings are 
based on substantial, competent, admissible evidence. 50 W. 
Broadway v. Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162 (Ut. 1989) and 
Prudential Capital Group v. Mattson, 802 P.2d 104 (Ut. App. 1990). 
The cross appeal challenges Conclusions of Law No's 17, 18, 
and 19 relating to which interest rate should apply. Those are 
reviewed for correctness. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P. 2d 198 
(Ut.1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND REGULATIONS 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS (Full text in Addendum 5) 
Utah Enabling Act, § 6 Utah Const. Art. X, § 5 
Utah Enabling Act, § 10 Utah Const. Art. XX, § 1 
2 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-1 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-18(3) (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-23 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-76 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-97 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 65A-l-2(3) (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(f) and (j) (1988) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2) 
REGULATIONS 
30 C.F.R. § 203.200(g) 
30 C.F.R. § 211.63(b) 
Rule 3(c) (2) of the Rules and Regulations Governing The Issuance 
of Mineral Leases of the Utah State Board of State Lands and 
Forestry dated November 4, 1982 
Rule 3(C) (2) of the Rules and Regulations Governing The Issuance 
of Mineral Leases of the Utah State Board of State Lands and 
Forestry dated December 26, 1983 
Rule M2a2(5) (f) of the Rules and Regulations Governing The 
Issuance of Mineral Leases of the Utah State Board of State Lands 
and Forestry dated July 1, 1986 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves a State coal lease held by the Plaintiff on 
school trust lands (Addendum 4) . School trust lands were given to 
the State of Utah, by the Federal Government, to provide a base to 
generate income for the benefit of the public school system. Utah 
Enabling Act § 6 and § 10, Utah Const. Art. X, § 5 and Art. XX, § 
1. 
The lease required payment of royalties at the rate of 15 
cents per ton of coal produced and sold or 
at the rate prevailing, at the beginning of 
the quarter for which payment is being made, 
for federal lessees of land of similar 
character under coal leases issued by the 
United States at that time, whichever is 
higher.... (emphasis added). 
(Exhibit 1). 
The Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry (hereinafter 
referred to as "Division" or "State") audited the payments and 
concluded that Plaintiff, which paid the lower rate, had underpaid 
the royalty. Demand was made on October 15, 1985, that Plaintiff 
pay the higher royalty found by the audit to have been proper 
(Exhibit 6). Plaintiff appealed the decision of the auditors to 
the Director of the Division of State Lands and Forestry. The 
Director, after a hearing, upheld the audit and the demand for 
payment. 
4 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff then filed this action in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court asking for a declaration that the State not collect 
the unpaid royalties. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. The trial court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, finding that Plaintiff owed nothing to the State. 
Defendants appealed the trial court's ruling to the Utah Supreme 
Court which vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the trial 
court with instructions on a number of issues. Plateau Mining v. 
Utah Division of State Lands, 802 P. 2d 720 (Ut. 1990), (hereinafter 
Plateau). The Supreme Court in Plateau stated that the law 
regarding trust lands governs the issues in this case (Id. at 72 3) 
and that to determine the intent of the original parties to the 
lease, the trial court must first look to the document itself (Id. 
at 725). It then instructed the trial court to find what federal 
royalty rate was prevailing for federal lessees of federal leases 
issued at that time (Id. at 726) . The Supreme Court then said 
that the alternative rate provision provides a practical method of 
determining the correct royalty and that the State had the right to 
rely on the lessee to determine and pay the correct royalty (Id. at 
72 6-27). Finally, it said that the State must receive full value 
for the trust assets (Id. at 729). 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
On remand, after a three day trial, the trial court found that 
8% of value, (approximately $2.00 per ton) was the only rate for 
5 
federal lessees of federal coal leases issued during the audit 
period (1979 to 1984), and was therefore the applicable prevailing 
rate and the rate which applied to the Plaintiff's lease. 
Plaintiff had paid royalties at the rate of 15 cents per ton. The 
trial court awarded judgment against Plaintiff for the unpaid 
royalties and interest at the statutory rate of 6% per annum. It 
is from that decision that Plaintiff takes this appeal. 
The State filed a cross appeal claiming the State is entitled 
to interest at the rates established by the rules and regulations 
adopted by the Board of State Lands and Forestry, (hereinafter 
"Board") rather than the statutory rate of 6%. 
PACTS 
Defendants dispute the facts used in Plaintiff's Brief. 
Plaintiff's Statement of the Issues is premised on a set of facts 
not found to be true by the trial court nor supported by the 
evidence. Defendants set forth here the facts as stipulated by the 
parties in the Second Amended Pre-Trial Order and those found by 
the trial court. 
The State of Utah and Plaintiff are parties to Utah State Coal 
Lease #22603 (Addendum 4, Stipulated Fact No. 3, Finding of Fact 
No. 1, Exhibit 1) . The land, which was subject to the coal lease, 
was granted to the State of Utah by the United States under the 
Utah Enabling Act for the support of the common schools (Stipulated 
Fact No. 5, Finding of Fact No. 3, Utah Enabling Act § 6). These 
6 
lands are managed by the Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry 
under policies, rules, and regulations established by the Board of 
State Lands and Forestry (Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-23) . The lease 
required, and the Plaintiff covenanted and agreed to pay, royalty, 
quarterly on the coal mined (a) at the rate of 15 cents per ton of 
coal produced from the leased premises or 
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning of the 
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal 
lessees of land of similar character under coal leases 
issued by the United States at that time whichever is 
higher . . . . (emphasis added). 
(Stipulated Fact No. 8, Finding of Fact No. 2, Exhibit 1), Plateau 
at 727-28. Plaintiff paid the State a 15 cent per ton royalty on 
all of the coal extracted from State Coal Lease ML 22603 beginning 
in July 1979 (Exhibit 2, Stipulated Fact No's 13, 31, Record 
(hereinafter R.) 672). 
The lease was originally issued to Malcolm McKinnon on 
February 8, 1965 (Exhibit 1, Stipulated Fact No. 3). The Estate of 
Malcolm McKinnon assigned the lease to Myron Fetterolf (of the 
Fetterolf Group, Inc.) on July 11, 1979 (Exhibit 66, Stipulated 
Fact No. 11) . Trail Mountain was owned by the Fetterolf Group, 
Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation, 80%; John L. Bell, 18%; and 
Charles A. Bass, 2% (R. 667). Trail Mountain Coal Company was 
involved with the State Lease from the time it was issued to 
Malcolm McKinnon and was the only party to extract coal from the 
State Lease and pay royalties on that coal (Exhibit 2, Stipulated 
Fact No. 9, R. 666, 668, 676). 
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On August 13, 1979, the Plaintiff entered into an "Agreement 
of Sublease" with Inez Lou Fetterolf, Executrix of the Estate of 
Myron F. Fetterolf (Exhibit 95, included herewith in Addendum 8, R. 
667) . As compensation for entering into this "Agreement of 
Sublease," the Fetterolf Group, Inc., was to be paid an 8% 
overriding royalty by Trail Mountain for the coal produced from the 
lease (Exhibit 95, p. 1). For the coal produced during the audit 
period, that calculates to an 8% overriding royalty of THREE 
MILLION NINE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTEEN 
DOLLARS AND FOUR CENTS ($3,925,817.04). By contrast, the State was 
paid 15 cents per ton royalty or TWO HUNDRED NINETY-FOUR THOUSAND 
TWO HUNDRED ONE DOLLARS AND FIFTY-THREE CENTS ($294,201.53) for all 
of the coal produced by Trail Mountain during the audit period 
(1979 to 1984) (Exhibits 2, 5). Neither the Board nor the Division 
was informed or made aware of the existence of the "Agreement of 
Sublease" (R. 668). 
On January 26, 1981, the Estate of Myron F. Fetterolf formally 
assigned the leasehold's interest under the State Coal Lease to 
Trail Mountain Coal Company (Exhibit 69, Stipulated Fact No. 16). 
Fetterolf was to be paid FOUR MILLION DOLLARS ($4,000,000) for this 
assignment in addition to the 8% overriding royalty previously 
reserved in the "Agreement of Sublease" (Exhibits 68, 70). 
When the lease was issued by the State on February 8, 1965, 
the royalty rate set by the Federal Government on its coal leases 
was generally fifteen cents per ton, the amount set forth in part 
8 
(a) of the State coal lease royalty provision (Stipulated Fact No. 
56, Finding of Fact No. 9). 
In August of 1976, the federal law changed with the enactment 
of the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act (FCLAA). Once the 
regulations implementing the new law were in place, eight percent 
(8%) was the royalty rate set by the Federal Government for coal 
mined by underground methods during the audit period (1979 to 1984) 
(Stipulated Facts No's 59, 61, Finding of Fact No's 10, 14, R. 1826 
and Exhibit 4). From January 1977 until the time of the trial, 
there were 177 federal coal leases issued or readjusted in Utah. 
All but 5 were issued at a royalty rate of 8% (R. 1826-27). Four 
of those five had royalty rates higher than 8% due to an 
experimental situation existing for a very short time as the new 
law was implemented (Exhibit 4, Finding of Fact No. 16, R. 1827-
28) . There were eighty (80) federal coal leases issued or adjusted 
in Utah during the audit period. In addition to those eighty (80) , 
there were twenty-five (25) federal coal leases under appeal for 
readjustment to an 8% royalty (Exhibit 4, Stipulated Fact No. 62). 
Those appeals were resolved in favor of the Federal Government with 
the leases being readjusted to 8% (R. 1843, Exhibit 4). 
Each time the Board of State Lands and Forestry addressed the 
royalty provision of its coal lease form from 1975 forward, it 
found that federal coal lease royalty rates were 8% for underground 
coal. At its monthly meeting on April 19, 1973, the Board 
instructed the Division staff to begin reviewing its lease forms 
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starting with the coal lease form (Exhibit 29) . The staff 
contacted the United States Geological Survey and learned that the 
Federal Government was working on changes to its leasing policy and 
acknowledged that the federal royalty rate for underground mined 
coal was 4% at that time (Exhibit 29) . At the Board meeting on 
August 21, 1975, the Division staff reported that contact with 
organizations involved in the coal industry, both in the public and 
private sector, revealed that 8% was the federal coal lease royalty 
rate (Exhibit 49) . This rate was incorporated into every new State 
coal lease issued thereafter (Exhibit 49) . At the Board meeting on 
May 18, 1977, the Board readjusted several coal leases and set the 
royalty at 8% (Exhibit 38). The minutes of the July 8, 1981 
meeting of the Board of State Lands and Forestry reflect that 
current lease forms carry an 8% production royalty (Exhibit 87). 
Plaintiff was aware of the provisions of the Federal Coal 
Leasing Amendments Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder 
which fixed the royalty rate at which federal coal leases mined by 
underground methods were issued at 8% and surface mined coal at 
12.5% (Exhibit 99, Stipulated Fact No. 63, R. 1969). Plaintiff 
held several federal coal leases in Utah (Stipulated Fact No's 69, 
75). Plaintiff's Federal Coal Lease U 082996 is located in the 
Trail Mountain mine as is the State Coal Lease (Stipulated Fact No. 
69) . This federal coal lease was issued on July 1, 1962 and 
modified to add an additional 40 acre tract on January 18, 1980 
(Stipulated Fact No's 70, 72). This modification, which occurred 
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very early in the audit period, included an 8% royalty for the 
additional tract (Stipulated Fact No. 72). Plaintiff's Federal 
Coal Lease U 49332 was issued February 18, 1983 and is also located 
in the Trail Mountain mine (Stipulated Fact No. 75). This lease 
required an 8% royalty (Stipulated Fact No. 75) . Despite being 
aware that the Federal Government was charging 8% royalties on its 
coal leases, (Stipulated Fact No's 61, 63), Plaintiff continued to 
pay 15 cents per ton royalty for all coal produced from the State 
Coal Lease (Stipulated Fact No. 31, Exhibit 5). 
In 1985 the State audited the royalty payments submitted by 
the Plaintiff (and other coal lessees) and concluded that Plaintiff 
should have paid, and be paying, royalty at the rate of 8% as 
required under part (b) of the lease royalty provision (Stipulated 
Fact No's 41, 42, 43, Finding of Fact No. 5, Exhibit 6). 
During the audit period the same royalty rate was being 
charged by the Federal Government for coal leases in Utah on all 
land in the State whether they were in the same mine, the same 
canyon, or the same area. The only distinction regarding character 
of land or coal was whether the mine was surface or underground. 
In this case it was an underground mine (Finding of Fact No. 16, R. 
1830). 
During the time Trail Mountain Coal Company mined TWO MILLION 
TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT AND THIRTY THREE ONE 
HUNDREDTHS (2,002,188.33) tons of the State's coal from State Coal 
Lease ML 22603, (Exhibit 5) the accounting manager and person 
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responsible for paying royalties on behalf of Plaintiff, never read 
the lease (R. 1970-71) . It was not until 1983 when Diamond 
Shamrock became involved with the State Lease that the lease was 
read for the first time (R. 1988-90, 2014-15). Trail Mountain was 
paid FORTY-NINE MILLION SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTEEN 
DOLLARS AND FIFTY-SIX CENTS ($49,072,713.56) for the coal (Exhibit 
5) • The contracts for the sale of the coal provided for Trail 
Mountain to be reimbursed for an 8% royalty plus transportation 
expenses incurred in the mining of the coal (Exhibits 97, P. 8; 98, 
P. 7). Trail Mountain paid the Fetterolf Group, Inc. FOUR MILLION 
DOLLARS ($4,000,000) (Exhibit 68, P. 1) plus an 8% overriding 
royalty (Exhibits 70, 95) which amounts to THREE MILLION NINE 
HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTEEN DOLLARS AND 
FOUR CENTS ($3,925,817.04 ) for the State Coal Lease. Despite 
these facts, Trail Mountain argues it should only have to pay TWO 
HUNDRED NINETY-FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED ONE DOLLARS AND FIFTY-
THREE CENTS ($294,201.53) (.6% (six-tenths of one percent) of the 
FORTY-NINE MILLION SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTEEN 
DOLLARS AND FIFTY-SIX CENTS ($49,072,713.56) it received for the 
coal) to the school trust. 
After a three-day trial, the Court found that Plaintiff, by 
reasonable inquiry, could have established the fact that the 
applicable prevailing federal rate was 8% of the value of the coal 
produced and the evidence showed that Trail Mountain paid 15 cents 
per ton for years without ever reading the lease or making any 
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inquiry as to the applicable rate (Finding of Fact No's 12, 13, R. 
1970, 1988-90, 2014-15, Exhibit 5). The Court awarded pre-judgment 
interest finding that the amount of royalty owed by Plaintiff to 
the school trust can be mathematically determined by multiplying 
the value of the coal by the royalty rate of eight percent (8%) 
(Finding of Fact No. 19) . Judgment was entered in the sum of THREE 
MILLION SIX HUNDRED THIRTY ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTEEN DOLLARS 
AND FIFTY-THREE CENTS ($3,631,615.53) in delinquent royalties 
together with interest on each delinquent payment from the date 
each payment became due (Finding of Fact No. 20). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE LAW RELATING TO SCHOOL TRUST LANDS PROVIDES THE BACKGROUND 
FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE GOVERNING PRINCIPLES IN THIS CASE. 
As a condition of statehood, many states, particularly in the 
West, were given certain lands to hold in trust to generate income 
for the benefit of the public schools. These lands were to be 
managed such that the state, as trustee, received full value for 
the trust assets. As trust assets, trust funds must be protected 
against loss or diversion. State constitutions, statutes, 
agreements, and court-imposed rules are subordinate to and must not 
interfere with the accomplishment of trust purposes. Doubts 
relating to questions of fact and law are to be resolved in favor 
of preserving the trust assets for trust purposes. 
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II. THE ARGUMENTS IN PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ARE BA8ED ON A VERSION OF 
FACTS REJECTED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND CONTRARY TO THE 
EVIDENCE. 
The trial court had a considerable body of evidence before it 
including a stipulation of facts by the parties and made findings 
and conclusions which are supported by that evidence. Plaintiff 
has not met its burden to show that the court's findings of fact 
are not supported by the evidence, but instead bases its arguments 
on facts contrary to those found by the court. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD PAY 
ROYALTY ON ALL COAL PRODUCED AND SOLD BY IT FROM THE LEASED 
PROPERTY INCLUDING THAT PRODUCED BEFORE SUBMITTING ITS REQUEST 
FOR APPROVAL OF THE ASSIGNMENT. 
Trail Mountain was the one and only party to mine coal from 
the State Coal Lease. It was the only party to pay royalties to 
the State for that coal. Trail Mountain's involvement with the 
State Lease began long before the audit period. The Agreement of 
Sublease was actually an assignment. Given these facts, 
Plaintiff's contention, that the State's claims for delinquent 
royalties for the period prior to the lease assignment and approval 
in 1981, are without merit. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS 
NOT TO BE APPLIED TO DEPRIVE THE STATE OF FULL VALUE FOR THE 
COAL TAKEN BY PLAINTIFF WAS CORRECT. 
The relationship between the State of Utah and Trail Mountain 
Coal Company obligated Trail Mountain to pay the correct royalties 
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to the State. Statutes of limitation should not apply in this case 
to deprive the beneficiaries of trust lands of the intended 
benefits of the trust. If a statute of limitation does apply, it 
has not run in this case because it would commence upon the last 
payment since this is an open, current, and mutual account and the 
statute of limitations does not start until the final payment. 
Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-2 provides a seven year statute of 
limitations rather than the six year statute of limitations urged 
by Plaintiff in the event any statute of limitations is applicable. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST, 
BUT IT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING INTEREST AT THE RATE PROVIDED BY 
THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE BOARD OF STATE LANDS AND 
FORESTRY, 
Interest and penalties on delinquent royalty payments are 
proper and necessary to preserve the trust assets. The proper rate 
of interest to be applied to the delinquent royalty payments is the 
rate adopted by the Board of State Lands and Forestry, not the 
lower statutory rate. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO AWARD TO PLAINTIFF A 
DEDUCTION AGAINST ROYALTIES DUE FOR CLAIMED TRANSPORTATION 
EXPENSES. 
The State Coal Lease form does not allow deductions for 
production or operational expenses such as transportation. The 
Federal Government, from which the State adopts its royalty rate 
but not its entire royalty calculation method, does not "mandate" 
deductions for transportation expenses. Trail Mountain did not 
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show a transportation deduction on any of its report forms for 
federal coal extracted from the same mine. The allowance of the 
claimed deduction would constitute a double deduction for 
transportation cost since sales contracts for the coal provided for 
a credit against sales price upon which the state royalty is 
calculated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LAW RELATING TO SCHOOL TRUST LANDS PROVIDES THE BACKGROUND 
FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE GOVERNING PRINCIPLES IN THIS CASE, 
The State Coal Lease is located on land granted to the State 
of Utah for the benefit of the public school system. In accepting 
these lands from the Federal Government, the State in its 
Constitution covenanted to hold these lands in trust for the 
purposes for which they were granted. Therefore, the Enabling Act, 
the Constitution of Utah, and the body of case law known as trust 
land law, govern the issues in this case. 
A, General Trust Land Law 
Beginning with the case of Trustees of Vincennes University v. 
State of Indiana, 55 U.S. 268 (1852), the United States Supreme 
Court has consistently held that a state holds school lands in 
trust for the benefit of its schools. Congress and the courts have 
placed protections on the use of the trust lands so that they are 
not exploited for private advantage or depleted by state action or 
inaction. Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 458 (1967). 
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The duty of the State in managing mineral rights on trust 
lands is to obtain full value for the trust assets: 
The royalty rate set by the state is important because it 
represents payment for a trust asset which will be gone 
forever once the mineral is removed from the ground. 
Therefore, the requirements of the Enabling Act and the 
trust concept are the most important factors to consider 
in determining an optimum royalty rate. If the rate is 
too low the state will be committing a breach of trust by 
diminishing the trust. Royalty payments are placed in a 
permanent trust fund, the corpus of which is invested; 
the trust is kept whole if fair market value is received. 
If the royalty rate is too low the trust will not be kept 
whole. 
State School Trust Lands and Oil and Gas Royalty Rates, Public Land 
Law Review, 119 (1982). See Utah Code Ann. § 65A-l-2(3), See also 
Andrus v. Utah. 446 U.S. 500 (1980) and Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 58 
Ut. 418, 199 P.2d 670, (Ut. 1921); Plateau at 729 (stating that 
less than full value undermines the trust); Lassen v. Arizona, 385 
U.S. 458, (1967) (declaring that the state is required to 
compensate the trust for full value for land taken by the state for 
a highway improvement); Kadish v. Arizona State Land Department, 
747 P.2d 1183, (Ariz. 1987), aff. 109 S. Ct. 2037 (1989), 
(forbidding the issuance of mineral leases without payment of full 
value and declaring invalid lease agreements entered into by the 
state at a fixed royalty rate of less than full value); Department 
of State Lands v. Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948 (Mont. 1985) (holding 
that the trust could not be divested of water rights without full 
value compensation); State of Alaska v. University of Alaska, 624 
P.2d 807 (Ak. 1981) (declared that the trust must receive full 
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value for land placed in a state park) ; Anderson v. Nebraska Board 
of Education, 256 N.W.2d 318 (Neb. 1977) (the duty of the trustee 
is to obtain maximum return to the trust estate in requiring state 
to accept late bid at an auction); State v. Phillips Petroleum 
Company. 258 P.2d 1193 (Ok. 1953) (state clerk could not by mistake 
grant minerals located on trust land as it is state's duty as 
trustee to receive full value); Oklahoma Education Assoc. Inc. v. 
Niah, 642 P. 2d 230 (Ok. 1982) (striking down a statute which 
allowed low interest loans from trust funds since it is trustee's 
duty to obtain the maximum benefit for the trust); State v. 
Northwest Maanesite Company, 182 P.2d 643 (Wash. 1947) (a land 
commissioner could not allow by agreement the taking of trust 
assets for less than full value); and Caffall v. Washington, 484 
P.2d 912 (Wash. 1971) (in declining to transfer trust lands to the 
highest bidder at an auction ruled that the public is entitled to 
the best possible bargain for the sale of trust assets). 
Plaintiff's argument, that the State urges the adoption of a 
position outside the "reach of ordinary legal principles" (Brief of 
Appellant at 36) , ignores the huge body of law previously cited 
that stands for the proposition that when dealing with school trust 
lands, the State's duty is prescribed by the State Constitution 
and acceptance of the lands from the United States. In Caffall. 
Supra, the Supreme Court of Washington rejected the argument that 
the state must not expect more favorable treatment than is fair 
between men. Id. at 916. Ordinary rules simply don't apply to 
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situations involving trust lands. The Supreme Court of Montana in 
Department of State Lands v. Pettibone, Supra, stated that 
"[s]chool trust lands are subject to a different set of rules than 
other public lands." Id. at 955. See also Kadish, Supra. 
To enforce the important trust purposes, the courts have 
consistently rejected any state statutes, constitutional 
provisions, and court-imposed doctrines that restrict the state 
from obtaining full value from trust lands. Plaintiff argues that 
the obligations inherent to the administration of trust lands stop 
when the State receives at least the "agreed price" for trust 
assets (Brief of Appellant at 35). Such a position is simply not 
supported by the numerous courts which have addressed the issue. 
The Kadish Court noted that federal law is supreme in this field 
and that 
[n]either this court, nor the legislature, nor the people 
may alter or amend the trust provisions contained in the 
Enabling Act without congressional approval. 
Jd. at 1185. It analyzed the court cases dealing with this subject 
and pointed out that: 
[t]he courts have consistently construed the scope of 
federal land grants in favor of the government. In 
dealing with trust land... all doubts must be resolved in 
favor of protecting and preserving trust purposes. 
Id. at 1195. The Supreme Court of Washington addressed this issue 
in County of Skamania v. Washington, 685 P.2d 576 (Wash. 1984). In 
striking down a state law that allowed timber lessees to take trust 
assets for less than full value, the court stated "We think the Act 
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falls far short of the state's constitutionally imposed duty to 
seek "full value" for trust assets." Id. at 582. 
B. Utah Enabling Act 
Utah is one of thirty (30) public land states whose Enabling 
Act granted lands to be used for the support of schools and 
institutions. L. Mall, Public Land and Mining Law, 44-47 [3 Ed. 
1981]. The Utah Enabling Act granted to the State four (4) 
sections of land in each township for the support of the common 
schools. Utah Enabling Act § 6. Section 10 of the Enabling Act 
provided that the lands granted shall constitute a permanent school 
fund, the interest of which only should be expended for the support 
of schools. 
C Utah Constitution 
The State of Utah, in its Constitution, accepted those lands 
granted to the State in the Enabling Act, in trust for the 
respective purposes for which they had been granted. Constitution 
of Utah, Art. XX, § 1. In doing so, the State of Utah agreed and 
covenanted that 
(A) the land and its proceeds would be held in trust for 
the support of the common schools, Utah Enabling Act, § 
6, Constitution of Utah, Article XX, § 1 
(B) the State would establish a school trust fund, 
Constitution of Utah, Article X, § 5, and 
(C) the State would hold the trust harmless from loss or 
diversion. Constitution of Utah, Article X, § 5 (amended 
effectively July 1, 1987 with Section 5 becoming Sections 
5 and 7.) 
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The effect of the Utah Enabling Act and the Constitution of Utah on 
school trust lands is that the lands are held in a binding, 
permanent trust to generate financial aid to support the public 
school system. Utah v. Kleppe. 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1978) 
reversed on other around 446 U.S. 500 (1980). Actions which result 
in the trust not receiving full return on its assets are not to be 
upheld or supported by the court. Plateau at 729. The trustee is 
required to obtain full value for leases of school trust land and 
the assets are guaranteed by the State against loss or diversion. 
Plateau; Van Wagoner. 
D. The State Of Utah's Performance Of Its Responsibility As 
Trustee. 
In order to perform its trust responsibilities, the State 
established the Board of State Lands and Forestry and charged it 
with the responsibility of managing the state's trust lands. Utah 
Code Ann. § 65-1-1 et seq. The Utah Legislature provided that the 
form of all mineral leases and other relevant instruments are to be 
prescribed by the Board (Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-18(3)), and provided 
that the Board shall, by rules and regulations, prescribe the 
amount of royalty and the basis upon which the royalty shall be 
computed, with such other details as may be necessary in the 
interest of the State. Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-2 3, and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 65-1-76, also require the approval of the Attorney General on all 
leases and contracts before they are executed by the Board. 
The Board has full power and authority to prescribe the 
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necessary rules and regulations to accomplish the purposes and 
objectives for which it was established. Utah Code Ann.§ 65-1-1, 
§ 65-1-23, § 65-1-97; See also, McKniaht v. State Land Board, 381 
P.2d 726, (Ut. 1963). The Boardfs responsibilities include 
managing the public lands in the most prudent and profitable 
manner. The Board is, therefore, given discretion in setting 
policies and rules that carry out those responsibilities. Colman 
v. Utah State Land Board. 403 P.2d 781 (Ut. 1965). When the 
statutory requirements are not met there is no contract binding 
upon the State. Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Ut. 
1976). 
Lessees of school trust lands take leases with notice of and 
subject to the law and the trust responsibilities of the state. 
State v. Board of Educational Lands and Funds, 65 N.W.2d 392 (Neb. 
1954). Because the lease at issue involves trust lands, it is 
clear that the law regarding trust lands governs this case. 
II. THE ARGUMENT8 IN PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ARE BASED ON A VERSION OF 
FACTS REJECTED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND CONTRARY TO THE 
EVIDENCE. 
A. The Trial Court's Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law 
Are Proper And Are Supported By The Evidence. 
The trial court, in reaching its decision, had the ruling of 
the Utah Supreme Court in Plateau, the Second Amended Pre-Trial 
Order containing 77 paragraphs of stipulated facts, 109 exhibits, 
and testimony from numerous witnesses over the course of a three 
day trial. Under Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
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Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses. 
See also, Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Ut. 
1989). 
The trial court made findings on the issues raised in 
Plaintiff's brief. The trial court, however, did not make the 
findings Plaintiff wanted. Plaintiff, instead of marshalling the 
facts that support the trial court's findings and then showing that 
there was not evidence sufficient to support those findings, as it 
is required to do, relies on its own version of the facts in 
arguing that the trial court erred. Plaintiff's version of the 
facts is established by making statements which are not supported 
by the record and taken out of context. 
Plaintiff's claim, that the trial court's rulings on the 
interpretation of the lease royalty provision rewrite and delete 
key phrases (Brief of Appellant at 27) , is without merit. 
Plaintiff mischaracterizes the trial court's findings to say that 
it deleted from the lease language the phrase "land of similar 
character." On the contrary, the Court found that the Federal 
Government had only two classifications of coal leases: surface and 
underground. The rate for federal lessees would be 8% for 
underground coal regardless of the character of the land (R. 1677) . 
The evidence established and the trial court ruled that the 
interpretation arrived at during the audit incorporates all of the 
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lease language; it does not delete or rewrite any of the phrases of 
the lease royalty provision (R. 1675-78). 
Plaintiff makes the bold claim that contrary to the 
instruction of the Supreme Court, 
The Court did not inquire how the Board and the Division 
had construed "land of similar character" or what meaning 
the State had given to the "rate prevailing" on federal 
leases "issued by the United States at that time." 
(State Lease, Trial Exhibit 1) Instead, the court 
announced that the "different interpretations" that could 
be placed on such clauses were "not important." (R. 
1677). (Brief of Appellant at 17-18). 
The above cited reference to the record (R. 1677) is page four of 
the court's Memorandum Decision. The court did not say that 
"different interpretations" that could be placed on such clauses 
were "not important." The court's ruling, in context, is as 
follows: 
Since this rate was being charged by the federal 
government on all its coal land in the state of Utah, 
except for a very few isolated exceptions that were made 
because of specific application, the different 
interpretations that could be placed on "land of similar 
character" ceases to be a problem. The same federal rate 
was being charged whether the land was within the same 
mine, the same canyon, or the same area. That provision 
under these circumstances, had no particular 
significance. 
Since the rate fixed by the federal government was 
almost universally applied during the audit, the question 
of whether it applied to lessees of land issued prior to 
or at the time of the beginning of the quarter when the 
payment was to be made likewise is not important since 
the same rate applies to both situations. 
(Memorandum Decision at 4 which is R. 1677). 
Plaintiff makes another reference to this portion of the trial 
court's Memorandum Decision in stating "Accordingly, it is 
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necessary to give some meaning to "coal leases issued by the United 
States at that time" (State Lease, Trial Exhibit 1); the phrase 
simply cannot be dismissed (or deleted) as "not important" (R. 
1677)" (Brief of Appellant at 31, 32). The text of R. 1677 
referred to above, demonstrates that the court did not dismiss any 
phrase as Plaintiff contends. 
B. Plaintiff's Claim That The Intent Of The Drafters Of The 
Utah State Lease For Coal And The Administrative 
Interpretations And Instructions Are Contrary To The Findings 
And Conclusions Of The Court Is Not Supported By The Evidence, 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court's findings ignore the 
original intent of the drafters of the lease and the interpretation 
by the State of the royalty provision (Brief of Appellant at 22). 
Both Charles Henderson and Donald Gail Prince, whose testimony 
Plaintiff claims is ignored by the Court, appeared as witnesses in 
support of the State. The court's findings relating to the meaning 
of the royalty provision in the lease are consistent with the 
testimony of Henderson and Prince. The trial court found (a) that 
the intent of the drafters of the lease was to fix the royalty 
payment equal to, or the same as, that being paid to the federal 
government on coal leases on federal land, (Memorandum Decision p. 
2 which is R. 1675, Finding of Fact No. 8), see Henderson and 
Prince, transcript pages 88 which is R. 1854, 91-92 which are R. 
1857-58; 95 which is R. 1861; 97 which is R. 1863; 150 which is R. 
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1915, 154 which is R. 1918A1; (b) that Plaintiff had the 
obligation under the lease to determine and pay the correct 
royalty, but the only effort made by Plaintiff was, without even 
reading the lease (R. 1988-90, 1970), to talk to employees of the 
Division as to its understanding (Memorandum Decision p. 5 which is 
R. 1678, Finding of Fact No. 17) , and that was done only after many 
years of mining the coal from the lease (R. 1979-83) and paying 15 
cents per ton, (Exhibits 5, 11) ; (c) Plaintiff could have, by 
reasonable inquiry, established the prevailing rate (Memorandum 
Decision p.3, which is R. 1676, Finding of Fact No. 12), and (d) 
there is no injustice in requiring Plaintiff to pay the royalty 
called for in the lease (Memorandum Decision p. 7 which is R. 1680, 
Conclusion of Law No. 14). 
Plaintiff argues that the State previously interpreted the 
lease to require the payment of a 15 cent per ton royalty (Brief of 
Appellant at 11) . In making this argument, Plaintiff relies 
heavily on the testimony of Ralph Miles to support the proposition 
that there was an "intent and interpretation" (Brief of Appellant 
at 16). Upon close scrutiny, Mr. Miles1 testimony really says that 
he was unaware of any official interpretation (R. 2124-25). All 
other State witnesses said the royalty provision was never 
officially interpreted until the audit (R. 2103, 1861-62, 1902-06). 
As Plaintiff noted in its brief, page 154 of the trial transcript does not bear a record number. For 
the Court's convenience, we will use the same numbering convention as did the Plaintiff. 
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State's present or new interpretation requires the payment of the 
"highest royalty currently charged" for "new" federal leases (Brief 
of Appellant at 3) ignores the facts in evidence that 8% is not the 
highest royalty rate charged by the federal government, but rather 
it is the only rate for which federal coal leases were issued and 
is therefore the prevailing rate during the audit period. 
Plaintiff contends that 8% became the prevailing rate on July 
1, 1983 when it was issued its federal coal lease at 8% (Brief of 
Appellant at 24) • If that were true, one should ask why didn't 
Plaintiff begin paying the State an 8% royalty at that time? 
Plaintiff further claims that the Federal Government has authority 
to issue its leases below 8% (Brief of Appellant at 28) . The State 
concedes that such may be the law but points to the evidence that 
the United States, although authorized to do so, as a matter of 
policy did not issue leases for less than 8%. The lease document 
in question refers to the rate paid by "federal lessees" and 
qualifies federal lessees as those "under coal leases issued by the 
United States," (emphasis added) not coal leases which might have 
been issued (Exhibit 1). 
The Plaintiff's repeated contention that all federal leases 
need to be counted to determine the prevailing federal rate in the 
"same area" or "same mine" is simply a smoke screen, since the 
prevailing rate was the same nationwide (R. 1823-25). Furthermore, 
the leases issued in the same mine or same area during the audit 
period carried an 8% royalty (Exhibit 4). As Plaintiff states, 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD PAY 
ROYALTY ON ALL COAL PRODUCED AND 8QLD BY IT FROM THE LEASED 
PROPERTY INCLUDING THAT PRODUCED BEFORE SUBMITTING ITS REQUEST 
FOR APPROVAL OF THE ASSIGNMENT. 
Trail Mountain Coal Company is the party responsible to pay 
the royalties due the State of Utah under the lease in question 
because it was Trail Mountain that actually mined and sold the coal 
during the entire audit period (Exhibit 5) . Also, as the 
recognized operator of the mine, bonded, and accepted by the State, 
Trail Mountain was the actual party holding the right to mine the 
coal under the lease and was involved from the day the lease was 
issued by the State through the time covered by the audit (Exhibits 
2, 82, Stipulated Fact No. 9, R. 666, 668, 676). The State lease 
was only a part of the Trail Mountain mining operation which 
comprised an area composed of various leases obtained from private 
land owners, the State of Utah, and the Federal Government. 
(Stipulated Fact No's 12, 69, 75). 
All the parties involved knew that Trail Mountain was in fact 
the operator and real party in interest dealing with the State on 
these matters. If Trail Mountain was not the operator and real 
party in interest, why would its representative visit the Division 
offices as early as 1976, (Brief of Appellant at 9-10) three years 
prior to the "attempted" oral sublease (Agreement of Sublease), and 
five years prior to the assignment? The answer simply is that 
Trail Mountain was in fact the party which dealt with the State 
regarding this lease from the date of issuance. 
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Mountain (Exhibits 69, 95). Trail Mountain was obligated to file 
reports with the State, which it did, and to pay the royalties 
required by those reports, which it also did. Trail Mountain 
simply paid the royalty at the wrong rate. Trail Mountain is the 
only party which paid royalties to the State for State Coal Lease 
ML 22603 (Exhibit 2) . Trail Mountain began paying royalties in 
July 1979 (Exhibit 2, 5). If Trail Mountain is not the responsible 
party, why is it the only party to have paid royalties; royalties 
which were paid prior to the assignment in 1981? 
The court should keep in mind that it was the Plaintiff, Trail 
Mountain, which commenced this lawsuit asking the court to enjoin 
the State from collecting the unpaid royalties (R. 1) . It was the 
Plaintiff that paid the royalties at the rate of 15 cents per ton 
throughout the audit period and it was Plaintiff that mined and 
sold the coal under the terms of the lease and received the benefit 
therefrom (Exhibit 2, Stipulated Fact No's 13, 31). To hold that 
Trail Mountain should not be held responsible for payment of 
royalties for coal it has mined and sold under the coal lease in 
question would be unjust and reward bad faith and disregard 
concepts of fairness. If a party can extract minerals from State 
school lands and deal on an on-going basis with the State over a 
period of time and then claim no payment is due for the minerals 
which it has mined and sold by taking the position that it did not 
have a contract with the State, justice is not served. If the 
Plaintiff didn't have a valid lease with the state, then it 
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"When to the constitutional provision last 
quoted, we add the further provision that the 
State of Utah guarantees the proceeds of these 
lands against loss or diversion, thus making 
itself an insurer and is honor bound to make 
good any loss that the schools might sustain 
by diverting these lands or permitting them to 
be diverted to other purposes, the conclusion 
becomes irresistible that the statutes of 
limitation have no application to the land in 
question." Id. at 676. 
The Van Wagoner Court in quoting O'Brien v. Wilson, a Washington 
Supreme Court opinion said: 
" . . . this being the nature of the title to 
the land granted for the special purposes 
named, it is evident that to give such 
efficacy to a statute of limitation of a state 
as would operate to confer a permanent right 
of possession to any portion thereof upon an 
individual for his private use would be to 
allow that to be done by indirection which 
could not be done directly; and to permit 
title to school lands in this state to be 
acquired indirectly by adverse possession 
would be repugnant to the laws of the United 
States and the Constitution of the state." Id. 
at 676. 
The Van Wagoner case was reheard and the Utah Supreme Court 
decision, in upholding its original decision, added to the original 
opinion by saying: 
" . . . this Court was compelled to determine 
the question once for all as to whether or not 
the statutes of limitation relied on by 
appellants apply to the lands in dispute. We 
came to the conclusion the statutes do not 
apply for the reason for such application 
would be repugnant to both the letter and the 
spirit of the state Constitution, the 
provisions of which we have quoted at length 
in the opinion. The Constitution declares 
that such lands "shall be held in trust for 
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State of Utah constitute an open, current, and mutual account and 
statutes of limitation do not start to run until final payment. 
See Wortman v. Sun Oil Company, 236 Kansas 266, 690 P.2d 385 (Ks. 
1984) . 
Third, assuming arguendo that a limitation of actions were to 
apply, it would be that found in § 78-12-2 which provides: 
"The state will not sue any person for or in 
respect to any real property, or the issue or 
profits thereof, by reason of the right or 
title of the state to the same, unless: 
(1) such right or title shall have accrued 
within seven years before any action or other 
proceeding for the same shall be commenced; or 
(2) the state or those from whom it claims 
shall have received the rents and profits of 
such real property, or some part thereof, 
within seven years, (emphasis added). 
While the plaintiff has contended that a six year statute of 
limitations applies and has referred to Article II of Title 78 
dealing with limitations of actions other than real properties and 
particularly § 78-12-23(2) (Brief of Appellant at 42), it has 
ignored the actual provision which would apply which is § 78-12-2 
dealing with the issues and profits from lands and applying that to 
the State. If this Court were to find that a statute of limitation 
does apply, it would be the one provided in § 78-12-2 which would 
allow the State to recover all but the first two quarters of the 
audit period, not the year and two quarters as contended by 
Plaintiff. 
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V. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IM" AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST. 
BUT IT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING INTEREST AT THE RATE PROVIDED BY 
THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE BOARD OF STATE LANDS AND 
FORESTRY. 
A. Pre-judgment Interest Should Be Paid On Delinquent 
Royalties. 
In Biork v. April Industries. Ir-r ^60 r "i onc: /TT+- ^*?~>\ 
the Utah Supreme Co\ irt stated: 
As to the allowance of interest. ^ei^ie .-.iwjmci, ... 
Court has heretofore spoken, and the law in Utah is 
clear, viz: where the damage is complete and the amount 
of loss can be measured by facts and figures, interest 
should be allowed from that time and not from the date of 
judgment. 
~~ " "
 s
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Compc Fitzgerald v. Critchiie^.. 
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in view ui Ci±« uctckground and explanation given in that opinion, 
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that is, that these lands are school trust lands and that the 
State, as trustee, has a duty to obtain full value for them, the 
trial court should reconsider its prior conclusion of not awarding 
interest. Id. at 732. The trial court, after trial, did award 
pre-judgment interest at the statutory rate of 6%, the rate in 
effect when the state coal lease was issued. 
B. The Board Of State Lands And Forestry Has Statutory Power 
To Adopt Rules And Regulations Setting Interest And Penalties 
On Delinquent Royalties Which Rules Should Have Been Applied 
In This Case. 
The Board of State Lands and Forestry is authorized by statute 
to adopt rules and regulations with regard to the management of the 
school trust land and to accomplish the purposes of the trust. 
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-23. The Board, in carrying out those 
responsibilities has, over the years, adopted rules and regulations 
dealing with the proper and timely payment of royalties on mineral 
leases. 
The Board established rules and regulations regarding interest 
and late fee penalties. Effective November 4, 1982, an interest 
rate of 1.5% per month was charged on past due royalties (Exhibit 
100). Effective December 26, 1983, an interest rate of 1.5% per 
month was charged on past due royalties, together with a 6% late 
fee penalty (Exhibit 101). Effective July 1, 1986, an adjustable 
interest rate, based on the rate charged by the Internal Revenue 
Service plus 4%, was charged on past due royalties (Exhibit 102). 
Numerous State agencies have rules that provide for late fee 
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In the instant case, the trial court properly awarded pre-
judgment interest, but erred in its decision not to use the rate 
set by the rules and regulations of the Board. The court, in 
refusing to apply the regulatory interest rate, concluded that to 
do so would change the monetary obligations under the lease. This 
conclusion is error. Imposition of interest and late fees on 
delinquent payments do not change the terms of the lease. A change 
in the interest rate available in the event of breach does not 
impair obligations under contracts entered into prior to the 
change. Interest is merely an element of damages. Jamaica Sav. 
Bank v. Toomey. 77 Misc 2d 887, 355 NYS2d 268, affd 46 App. Div. 2d 
847, 363 NYS2d 313 (N.Y. 1974). Appellant by its own choice 
elected not to pay the royalties on time. In doing so, Appellant 
understood or should have understood that there would be 
consequences of that breach. States may alter laws governing 
remedies available under an existing contract so long as an 
effective remedy is preserved. Siebert v. Lewis, 122 U.S. 284, 30 
L. Ed 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190 (1887); Edwards v. Kearzev. 96 U.S. 595, 
24 L. Ed 793 (1877); Re: Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho 797, 209 P 
449 (Id. 1922) . A change or limitation of a remedy, which does not 
materially abridge a right, does not impair an obligation of a 
contract. Kirkman v. Bird. 22 Utah 100, 61 P. 338 (Ut. 1900); 
Salter v. Nelson. 85 Utah 460, 39 P.2d 1061 (Ut. 1935). 
The lease is silent on the question of interest or even the 
remedies available in the event of a failure by the lessee to pay 
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C. The Statutory Rate Of 6% Does Not Provide Full Value To 
The Trust Because 6% Was Below Market Rates During The Time 
Period Involved Resulting In A Low-Interest Loan To The 
Plaintiff, 
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in return for the use of trust property or loan of trust 
funds. 
Id, at 236. The Court then stated that to allow below market 
interest rate loans would result in the trust subsidizing the 
farming and ranching operations, which was contrary to the Oklahoma 
Constitution and Enabling Act. 
The statutory rate of 6% during the audit period is below 
market rates of interest. If Plaintiff had paid the royalties on 
time, as it covenanted and agreed to do, those funds would have 
been deposited in the School Trust Fund and earned the same 
interest rates as did the other State trust funds. Between 1978 
and 1985, the State Treasurer's Investment Pool, which includes all 
trust funds entrusted to the State, earned from 7% to 14.24% in 
interest. The prime rate of interest and the rate charged by the 
Internal Revenue Service on delinquent tax payments during the time 
over which the Court awarded 6% interest are listed in Addendum 6. 
The trial court awarded pre-judgment interest, at the rate of 
6% (Finding of Fact No. 21) . Had the trial court properly applied 
the Board's rules and regulations, which were in place to help 
accomplish for the State the duty to return full value to the 
trust, the amount of $6,105,638.22 (SIX MILLION ONE HUNDRED FIVE 
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHT DOLLARS AND TWENTY-TWO CENTS) (R. 
1940) in pre-judgment interest would have been awarded. As a 
result of the trial court's ruling, the school trust fund has lost 
approximately FOUR MILLION DOLLARS ($4,000,000). To not award that 
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I THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO AWARD TO PLAINTIFF A 
DEDUCTION FOR CLAIMED TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES. 
A. Plaintiff Did Not Prove Entitlement To Transportation 
Costs* 
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43 
B. Plaintiff's Transportations Expenses Were Reimbursed By The 
Buyers Of The Coal Extracted From The State Lease. 
Trail Mountain had contracts for the sale of coal under which 
it was allowed credits against the sales price of the coal for the 
transportation of the coal to market (Exhibits 97, p. 8; 98, p. 7), 
To allow the credit against the sales price upon which the royalty 
is calculated and then in addition allow a separate deduction for 
transportation would constitute a double deduction for 
transportation. Plaintiff has already received credit for 
transportation costs from the purchasers of the State's coal. The 
court should not now make Utah's school children pay again for the 
same costs. 
C. Plaintiff Is Not Entitled To An Automatic Transportation 
Deduction Under Either Federal Or State Law. 
The State coal lease contains no mention of any type of 
deduction for transportation or any other production or operational 
expense (Exhibit 1). There is also no Division of State Lands and 
Forestry regulation or Utah Statute which allows transportation or 
any other expense to be deducted from royalty payments for any 
mineral or commodity in which the State holds an interest. The 
school trust is not in the business of subsidizing the coal 
industry by sharing in the expenses related to mineral operations 
on trust lands, and such was not the intention of the Enabling Act 
which granted these lands to the State. 
The lease calls for the payment of royalty based on the value 
of the coal produced or sold. The sales price is the fairest 
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indication of value and a percentage rate allows the royalty to 
fluctuate with changing market conditions. The market price 
reflects the costs to produce and sell the coal including labor, 
equipment, transportation, and royalties. To allow Plaintiff to 
deduct from the price of coal the cost of transporting it would, in 
effect, incorporate a new term in the lease agreement entered into 
by the parties. 
Plaintiff has argued that if the State is allowed to adopt the 
federal royalty rate it should also be required to adopt the 
federal royalty scheme and definition of value for the basis of 
calculating royalties. Defendants disagree. The State coal lease 
form, by adopting the prevailing federal rate, does not adopt the 
federal method of calculating royalties but merely refers to the 
rate prevailing for federal lessees on leases issued at the time 
the state royalty payment is due. 
What is more informative than what the Brief of Appellant says 
about transportation deductions, is what it does not say. 
Plaintiff claims that it should be allowed a transportation 
deduction on royalties payable to the State because such is allowed 
under the federal scheme. Plaintiff does not claim however, that 
it actually received or took such a deduction on its federal 
leases. 
Trail Mountain mined coal from federal leases in the same mine 
and paid a royalty of 8% on that coal. The federal coal and state 
coal was mined concurrently and transported to the same point of 
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sale (Stipulated Fact No.fs 69, 75). The federal royalty reporting 
forms have a space for reporting transportation expenses (Exhibit 
99) . Trail Mountain did not claim a deduction for transporting its 
federal coal on the royalty reports it filed with the Federal 
Government on coal from the same mine (Exhibit 99) . However, 
transportation costs may have been backed out or deducted from the 
values used to calculated the federal royalty (R. 1976). It is 
therefore possible that transportation costs were also backed out 
of the values used to determine the royalty owed to the State (R. 
1942-44). 
The Federal Government, in its mineral leasing programs, has 
also dealt with the problem of determining deductions, including 
those for transportation, in its royalty calculations. However, 
transportation deductions are not allowed by the Minerals 
Management Service (hereinafter "MMS") unless they are requested 
and approved. Coastal States Energy Company, MMS-86-0149-MIN. 
Trail Mountain relies on references to "longstanding MMS policy" 
(R. 2770-71) to justify its claim for transportation deductions. 
The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking upon which Plaintiff relies was 
published more than two years after the Trail Mountain audit. The 
language Plaintiff relies on is found in a section entitled 
"Proposed §206.262, Transportation Allowances" and states in 
pertinent part: 
...[T]he proposed regulation is a continuation of 
longstanding MMS policy; however, there has never been 
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explicit guidance or regulation pertaining to coal 
transportation allowances. 
* * * * 
The following explanation is not intended to be 
conclusive or exhaustive but is intended to convey the 
general criteria MMS would apply to determine whether a 
transportation allowance is warranted, (emphasis added) . 
Federal Register, Vol. 52, No. 10, 1840, 1846 (January 15, 1987). 
Presumably the use of the word "would" here indicates that the 
writer is not referring to criteria the MMS "does" use to determine 
transportation allowances, but the criteria the MMS "would" use if 
it elected to determine such allowance at some future time. The 
decision in the Coastal States, Supra, matter explains the MMS 
policy in stating: 
In accordance with these and subsequently 
amended provisions [referring to 30 CFR § 
211.63(b) and 30 CFR §203.200(g)], lessees may 
apply for approval of deductions from arm's-
length sales prices to reflect reasonable 
transportation and qualified processing costs 
incurred in connection with the sale. The 
RVSD gives effect to the approved deductions 
beginning with the first day of the month 
following the date that the lessee's deduction 
application is received by the RVSD. 
(emphasis added). MMS-86-0149-MIN. 
This case clearly demonstrates that the allowance of a 
transportation deduction was not automatic or "mandate[d]" (Brief 
of Appellant at 39) as Plaintiff claims. A federal lessee would 
have to apply for the transportation deduction and receive approval 
prior to taking the deduction in its calculation of royalties. 
Coastal States, Supra. Trail Mountain did not do so. 
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CONCLUSION 
The law has consistently held that transactions involving 
trust lands must result in the trust receiving full return on its 
assets. This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that 
Plaintiff should pay royalties at the rate of 8% of value of the 
coal produced from the leased properties. This Court should order 
that the Judgment be amended to require Plaintiff to pay interest 
on the delinquent royalties at the annual rate of 18% from December 
31, 1983 to July 1, 1986 plus 6% penalty and interest at the rate 
prescribed by Division of State Lands Rules and Regulations for the 
period involved. 
Respectfully submitted this Z7 day of May, 1993. 
McKEACHNIE & ALLRED 
Attorneys for Defendants 
B y : J i b ^ ^ ^ 
Gay]Sfe F. McKeachnie 
BV: rAur^a//^l, 
Clark B. Al lred 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH 
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION 
OF STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY, 
THE UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS 
AND FORESTRY, THE UTAH DEPART-
MENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 
DEE HANSEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 4847 
Trial of this matter came on regularly before the 
Court on March 17, 1992, and the Court received testimony and 
exhibits for and on behalf of each of the parties, and took 
this matter under advisement, and rules as here and after 
stated. 
This case has been before the Utah Supreme Court and 
many of the issues originally presented by the parties were 
disposed of by the decision of that Court, and the Supreme 
Court further gave direction to the trial court as to how the 
balance of the issues should be considered and determined. 
Under the coal lease entered into between the 
Plaintiff and the State of Utah, the Plaintiff was required and 
covenanted and agreed to pay royalty on the coal mined at the 
alternative rates as specified in Article III, Paragraph II (a) 
or (b), whichever was higher. 
During the audit period, the Plaintiff paid royalty 
under Paragraph (a), and it is the contention of the Defendants 
that the Plaintiff should have paid the royalty rate as 
specified under Paragraph (b), since that rate was higher. 
This Court has previously found by way of a partial 
summary judgment that Paragraph (b), on its face, is ambiguous 
and subject to varying interpretations. However, as the 
Supreme Court noted, this fact does not prevent the provisions 
enforcement, and that extrinsic evidence should be considered 
to resolve the ambiguity to carry out the true intent of the 
parties. 
The Supreme Court stated, "The language of the lease 
provision is clear. The intent of the parties was that the 
higher of the two rates should be paid the State". This 
conclusion has been further established by the evidence 
presented to the effect that the intent of the drafters of the 
lease was to fix the royalty payment equal to, or the same as, 
that being paid to the federal government on coal leases on 
federal land. 
(2) 
When the lease at issue in this case was signed and 
executed February 8, 1965, the rate set by the federal 
government on its coal leases was fifteen cents (150) a ton, 
which is the same amount provided as specified in Paragraph (a) 
of the State lease• 
In August of 1976, the federal government changed the 
amount to be paid on its coal leases to eight percent (8%) of 
the value of the coal produced, which would, if the intent of 
the drafters of the State lease is to be carried out, 
automatically require that the lessees under State leases pay 
the royalty as provided in Paragraph (b) , since the eight 
percent (8%) of the value of the production would be 
considerably higher than fifteen cents (150) a ton. 
Since the Plaintiff had the legal obligation of paying 
that higher rate commencing at that time and since the 
provisions of that paragraph may be subject to varying 
interpretations, the Court must make a finding as to the 
paragraph's meaning in view of all of the facts and 
circumstances existing at the time that the Plaintiff had the 
obligation of paying the greater amount. 
A reasonable inquiry by the Plaintiff would have 
established the fact, and this Court finds, that the prevailing 
federal rate during the period of the audit was eight percent 
(3) 
(8%) of the value of production. This was the one and only 
rate set by the federal government for underground mining 
royalty, and the facts would further show, and the Court finds, 
that all leases issued or readjusted during the audit period by 
the federal government, some one hundred seventy seven in the 
state of Utah, all but four or five, set the rate at the eight 
percent (8%) figure. 
In view of these facts, there can be no dispute or 
ambiguity as to the prevailing rate that was being paid to the 
federal government on its leases. 
Since this rate was being charged by the federal 
government on all its coal land in the state of Utah, except 
for a very few isolated exceptions that were made because of 
specific application, the different interpretations that could 
be placed upon "land of similar character" ceases to be a 
problem. The same federal rate was being charged whether the 
land was within the same mine, the same canyon, or the same 
area. That provision under these circumstances, had no 
particular significance. 
Since the rate fixed by the federal government was 
almost universally applied during the audit, the question of 
whether it applied to lessees of land issued prior to or at the 
time of the beginning of the quarter when the payment was to be 
made is likewise not important since the same rate applies to 
both situations. 
(4) 
The Court finds that there could be no ambiguity in 
the application of Paragraph (b) , and that the Plaintiff, if 
they had made reasonable inquiry and obtained the facts that 
were readily available, could have determined with certainty 
the amount of royalty that they should have been paying under 
the alternative royalty provision. 
The Utah Supreme Court in its decision stated, "The 
Plaintiffs were responsible for calculating the alternative 
federal prevailing royalty payments from the royalty reporting 
forms that they had submitted to the State". The Court further 
stated in another portion of the opinion, "In sum, the 
Plaintiffs had the duty to determine whether the prevailing 
federal rate was higher and if so, to pay at that rate. The 
alternative royalty provision did not require any affirmitive 
action by the State". 
In view of that responsibility imposed upon the 
Plaintiff, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs had no right to 
rely on any representations made by employees of the State 
Division of Lands and Forestry as to what the rate should be, 
or those employees interpretation as to what was meant by the 
wording in Paragraph (b) of the royalty clause. This is 
particularly true when considered with the fact that the leased 
(5) 
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ground was school trust lands. In another portion of the 
Supreme Courts opinion, the Court stated, "The Plaintiffs knew, 
or should have known, that the leased lands were trust lands 
and that they also knew that the lease required them to pay the 
prevailing federal rate when it was the higher rate". 
Reasonable prudence and diligence would require the 
Plaintiff to do more than make inquiry of employees of the 
Defendants who, in fact, would have no authority to alter or 
change the terms of the lease as to what royalties should be 
paid or as to the meaning of any terms. The facts show that 
this was the only action taken by Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff has further contended that the auditors 
used the wrong figures in calculating the delinquent royalty 
when they failed to give a credit for the cost of haulage. 
The State auditors relied upon production and sales revenues 
submitted to them by Bruce Anderson, the Plaintiff's accounting 
manager, and as the Supreme Court stated, "The State had a 
right to rely on the good faith of its lessees in calculating 
the royalty and submitting the required information". 
If a haulage allowance were to be made, application 
should have been made at the time that the figures and 
information were given to the State by the Plaintiff. 
(6) 
The Court can find nothing in the evidence that 
establishes that the State, through actions of anyone who had 
the authority to do so, intentionally waived the right to 
require payment of the greater amount as specified in the lease• 
The Court finds that the Board of State Lands and 
Forestry was the only one who could make binding obligations on 
the State of Utah relative to the lease, and that they made no 
indication that they were waiving the right to the highest of 
the rates contained in the royalty provision. The Court has 
concluded that the State did not waive its right to collect the 
eight percent (8%) value of production royalty. 
This Court cannot find evidence that shows that an 
injustice is being done by requiring the Plaintiffs to pay the 
eight percent (8%) royalty that would invoke the exception to 
the legal principle that generally estoppel may not be asserted 
against the State of Utah. There is no injustice in requiring 
the Plaintiff to do what they were required to do under the 
lease, and particularly is this true because of the State's 
obligation in administering trust lands. 
The Court further finds that the prevailing case-law 
in the state of Utah holds that the Statute of Limitations has 
no application as to school trust lands, and therefore denies 
the Plaintiff's defense that the audit period exceeds the 
period of six years imposed for collecting on written contracts. 
(7) 
The Court has concluded that the amount of royalty 
that should have been reported and paid by the Plaintiff each 
quarter was capable of a definitive determination, and when the 
Plaintiff failed to pay this amount when due, that the State 
was entitled to collect interest on all delinquent amounts. 
The lease itself is silent relative to the payment of 
interest or penalties on the delinquent royalty payments. 
Under these circumstances, the Court is of the opinion that the 
State is entitled to that rate of interest authorized by law on 
delinquent accounts which would be six percent (6%) on the 
delinquent payments, which was the legal rate in effect at the 
time the lease was executed. 
The Court has further concluded that the Board had no 
right by regulation to change the monetary obligation 
undertaken by the lessee. If such authority were allowed, the 
State Board could set any arbitrary rate that it saw fit, and 
completely rewrite the monetary obligations under the lease in 
the process. 
By making the Plaintiff legally obligated to pay the 
legal rate of interest on the delinquent payments, the State is 
receiving the maximum legal return under its obligation as 
trustee of the school lands. 
(8) 
The Court by way of partial summary judgment 
previously concluded that the document entitled "Sub-Lease" 
by which the Plaintiff obtained the right to mine under the 
State lease, was in fact an assignment. The Plaintiff has 
filed a motion requesting that the Court reconsider that 
ruling, and has submitted their Memorandum of Legal Points and 
Authorities. 
The Court grants the Motion to Reconsider, and has 
taken into account those additional matters contained in 
Plaintiff's Memorandum. 
However, the Court is still of the opinion that the 
document, even though entitled Sub-Lease, is in fact an 
assignment, since the Plaintiff received all rights under the 
lease and agreed to perform and assume all duties. 
THEREFORE, the Court's prior decision relative to the 
matter contained in the Partial Summary Judgment mentioned 
above shall remain in force and effect, and the Court is, on 
this date, signing a formal order to that effect. 
THEREFORE, the Court has concluded based upon the 
tonnage figures and sales prices as found by the State's 
auditors, that the Plaintiff owes to the Defendants the sum of 
$3,631,615.53 in delinquent royalty payments, together with 
interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all delinquent payments 
from the date that they became due. The Court grants judgment 
(9) 
in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff for this 
amount together with interest as stated, and directs that the 
Defendant prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a 
Decree in accordance with this decision. 
The Court further directs that the Defendants prepare 
and submit with its proposed Findings of Fact, an itemized 
statement of the interest calculations based upon six percent 
(6%) per annum, and if the Plaintiff objects to those 
calculations, the Court will set hearing to make a definite 
determination relative to the amount of interest. 
DATED this <?yfi "3av of March, 1992. 
(10) 
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attorneys, L.R. Curtis, Jr., and Richie D. Haddock. Defendants 
were represented by their attorneys, Gayle F. McKeachnie and Clark 
B. Allred. The parties prepared and submitted to the Court an 
Amended Pre-Trial Order, which set forth undisputed facts. The 
Court received testimony and exhibits offered by each of the 
parties, and after hearing argument from counsel, took the matter 
under advisement. This case has also been before the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah which decided certain issues and gave 
direction to the trial court as to how the remaining issues should 
be considered and determined. The Court having fully considered 
the matter, entered its Memorandum Decision, hereby enters the 
following Findings of Fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Utah State Land Board on behalf of the State of Utah 
and the Plaintiff are parties to a Utah State Coal Lease being 
Mineral Lease #22603. 
2. Pursuant to the terms of that lease, Plaintiff was 
required and covenanted and agreed to pay royalty on the coal mined 
at the alternative rates as specified in Article III, Second, (a) 
or (b) of the lease, which states as follows: 
The Lessee, in consideration of the granting 
of the rights and privileges aforesaid, hereby 
covenants and agrees as follows: 
• • * 
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SECOND: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or 
before the 15th day of the month succeeding 
each quarter, royalty 
(a) at the rate of 15 cents per ton of 2000 
lbs. of coal produced from the leased premises 
and sold or otherwise disposed of, or 
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning 
of the quarter for which payment is being 
made, for federal lessees of land of similar 
character under coal leases issued by the 
United States at that time, 
whichever is higher . . . . 
3. The real property which was subject to the State Coal 
Lease was granted to the State of Utah, under the Utah Enabling Act 
for the support of the common schools. 
4. During the time period 1979 through 1985, the Plaintiff 
mined coal from the property and paid the State of Utah royalty at 
15 cents per ton under provision (a) of the royalty clause in the 
State Coal Lease. 
5. In 1985 the State of Utah audited the performance of 
Plaintiff under the lease including the royalty payments by the 
Plaintiff. Following the audit the State claimed that the 
Plaintiff should have paid a royalty rate of 8% as specified under 
part (b) of the royalty provision since that was the higher rate. 
6. The Court had previously found that part (b) was ambiguous 
and subject to various interpretations. As noted by the Utah 
Supreme Court, that does not prevent enforcement of the royalty 
3 
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provision but rather requires the Court to receive extrinsic 
evidence to resolve the ambiguity and carry out the true intent of 
the parties. 
7. The Utah Supreme Court had previously stated that, 
The language of the lease provision is clear. 
The intent of the parties was that the higher 
of the two rates should be paid the state. 
8. That conclusion by the Utah Supreme Court was further 
established by the evidence received at trial to the effect that 
the intent of the drafters of the lease was to fix a royalty 
payment equal to, or the same as, that being paid to the federal 
government on coal leases on federal land. 
9. When the lease at issue in this case, was signed and 
executed on February 8, 1965, the standard royalty rate set by the 
federal government on its coal leases was fifteen cents (.15) per 
ton, the same amount set forth in part (a) of the State Coal Lease 
royalty provision. 
10. In August of 1976, the federal law changed. The Federal 
Coal Leasing Amendments Act was passed and regulations promulgated 
thereunder. At that time the federal government changed the amount 
to be paid on its coal leases to eight percent (8%) of the value of 
the coal produced. Leases issued after this date contained this 
royalty except for a few exceptions, specifically authorized upon 
application. 
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11. To carry out the intent of the drafters of the State Coal 
Lease, the lessees under the State Coal Leases after the change in 
the Federal law would automatically be required to pay the royalty 
provided in provision (b) , that being eight percent (8%) of the 
value of the coal production since that is higher than the fifteen 
cents per ton required under provision (a). 
12. The Plaintiff, by reasonable inquiry, could have 
established the fact that the prevailing federal rate during the 
period of the audit was eight percent (8%) of the value of the coal 
produced. 
13. Eight percent (8%) was the one and only royalty rate set 
by the federal government for underground mining during the time 
period in question with few exceptions. 
14. The prevailing federal rate during the audit period was 
eight percent of the value of the coal produced by the Plaintiff 
from the State Coal Lease and was the rate that should have been 
paid by the Plaintiff. 
15. All leases issued or readjusted by the federal government 
during the audit period, in the State of Utah, except four or five, 
set the royalty rate at eight percent (8%) of value. 
16. The same federal royalty rate was being charged by the 
federal government during the audit period for coal leases in Utah 
on all land whether it was within the same mine, the same canyon, 
5 
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or the same area. 
17, The only action taken by the Plaintiff to determine the 
correct royalty rate was to make inquiry of the employees of the 
Division of State Lands, who had no authority to alter or change 
the terms of the leases or establish what royalty should be paid or 
as to the meaning of any terms in the lease. 
18. Plaintiff claimed that it was entitled to a haulage 
allowance. However, Plaintiff never made application for such an 
allowance and never provided to the state information regarding 
such a claim. The State auditors relied upon the production and 
sales revenue information furnished by the Plaintiff. 
19. The amount of royalty owed for each quarter is capable 
of mathematical determination. The lease is silent as it relates 
to the payment of interest and penalties. 
20. Based on the tonnage figures and sales prices set forth 
on Schedule V to the Pre-Trial Order, the Plaintiff owes to the 
Defendant the sum of $3,631,615.53 in delinquent royalty payments 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum on each 
delinquent payment from the date each payment became due. 
21. Defendants have submitted with these Findings the 
interest calculation at the rate determined by the Court which 
interest is $2,070,955.93 through April 1, 1992. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court having made the preceding Findings of Fact hereby 
enters the following Conclusions of Law. 
1. Plaintiff had the legal obligation to determine and pay 
the correct royalty rate owed on coal produced under the State Coal 
Lease. 
2. The prevailing federal rate and therefor the rate the 
Plaintiff should have paid under part (b) of the royalty provision 
during the audit period was eight percent of the value of the coal 
produced. 
3. Based on the fact that the rate fixed by the federal 
government was almost universally applied during the audit the 
questions regarding the terms "land of similar character" and 
whether the provision applied to lessees of leases issued prior to 
or at the beginning of the quarter are not significant in 
determining the prevailing federal rate. 
4. The different interpretations placed on "land of similar 
character" portion of the royalty clause under these facts had no 
particular significance during the audit period. 
5. The Plaintiff had the duty to determine the prevailing 
federal rate. There is no ambiguity in the application of part (b) 
of the royalty provision and Plaintiff, by making reasonable 
inquiry, could have determined the amount of royalty it should have 
7 
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paid under the alternative royalty provision, 
6. The Plaintiff, under the terms of the lease, had the 
legal obligation to pay the higher rate commencing at the time the 
federal rate was increased to 8% . 
7. Plaintiff had no right to rely on any representations 
made by employees of the State Division of Lands and Forestry as to 
what the rate should be or those employees interpretation as to 
what was meant by the wording in part (b) of the royalty clause. 
This is particularly true when considered with the fact that the 
leased land was school trust lands. 
8. The Utah Supreme Court stated that "The Plaintiffs knew, 
or should have known, that the leased lands were trust lands and 
that they also knew that the lease required them to pay the 
prevailing federal rate when it was the higher rate." 
9. Plaintiff in the exercise of reasonable prudence and 
diligence was required to do more than make inquiry of State 
employees who had no authority to alter or change the terms of the 
lease as to what royalties should be paid or as to the meaning of 
the terms of the lease. 
10. Plaintiff is not entitled to a haulage allowance. 
11. There was no evidence that the State, through the actions 
of anyone who had authority to do so, intentionally waived the 
right to require payment of the correct amount of royalty owed 
8 
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under the lease. 
12. The Board of State Lands and Forestry is the only one 
that can make binding obligations on the State of Utah relative to 
the lease. There was no evidence that the Board made any 
indication that it was waiving the right to collect the highest 
rate provided for in the royalty provision. 
13. The State did not waive its right to collect royalties 
at the eight percent of the value of production. 
14. There is no evidence that an injustice is being done by 
requiring the Plaintiff to pay the correct amount of royalty that 
would invoke the exception to the legal principle that estoppel may 
not be asserted against the State of Utah. There is no injustice 
in requiring the Plaintiff to do what it was required to do under 
the lease and particularly is this true because of the State's 
obligation in administering trust lands. 
15. The prevailing case law holds that the Statute of 
Limitations has no application as to school trust lands. 
16. The amount of royalty that should have been reported and 
paid by the Plaintiff each quarter is capable of definitive 
determination. The State is entitled to collect interest on all 
delinquent amounts. 
17. The Court is of the opinion that the state is entitled to 
the rate of interest authorized by law, which is six percent (6%) 
9 
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the legal rate in effect at the time the lease was executed. 
18. The Board of the State Lands and Forestry had no right by 
regulation to change the monetary obligation undertaken by the 
lease. If such authority were allowed, the Board could set any 
arbitrary rate that it saw fit and rewrite the monetary obligation 
under the lease. 
19. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the legal rate of interest 
on delinquent payments and the State by receiving that interest 
fulfills it obligation as trustee of school lands. 
20. The Court has previously determined that the "Sub-lease" 
by which the Plaintiff obtained the right to mine under the state 
lease was an assignment. Plaintiff has filed a motion asking the 
Court to reconsider that ruling. The Court grants that motion and 
after taking into account the additional matters set forth in the 
Plaintiff's memorandum, is still of the opinion that the document, 
though entitled "Sub-lease", was in fact, an assignment since the 
Plaintiff received all rights under the lease and agreed to the 
performance of all duties. 
21. The Court's prior decision on that issue, therefore, 
remains in full force and effect and the Court has signed a formal 
order to that effect. 
22. Based on the tonnage figures and sales prices set forth 
on Schedule V to the Pre-Trial Order, the Court finds that the 
10 
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Plaintiff owes to the Defendant the sum of $3,631,615.53 in 
delinquent royalty payments together with interest thereon at the 
rate of 6% per annum on each delinquent payment from the date each 
payment became due. „ 
)7$ 
DATED this / r ay of May, 1992 
BY THE COURT: 
Boyd Bunnell^ Distrjkrlf/&udge Y4frff/4 
t:\marnie\trailffltn\finding.con 
11 
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DEC 11992 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
William B. Prince, 2653 
L. R. Curtis, Jr., 0784 
Brian T. Hansen, 5110 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-5800 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
Calvin L. Rampton, 2682 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
Attorneys for Trail Mountain Coal Company 
-~=L—ucp. 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH 
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE 
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND 
FORESTRY, THE UTAH BOARD OF 
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY, 
THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES, DEE HANSEN, 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES, 
Defendants. 
FINAL ORDER 
AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 4847 
Judge Boyd Bunnell 
By Order executed on September 10, 1992, the Court 
ordered that, to avoid any confusion with respect to the 
finality date for purposes of appeal, a final order and 
o 1002 
'
 !
-~5udgment would be entered herein only after the record hai
 r 1 
HA/ " !cp_rc?ed in Judgment Docket i \ G , I V" 
!9? 
been supplemented to include Trail Mountain Coal Company's 
transportation costs and an order incorporating the Court's 
transportation cost finding had been entered. The Court, 
having entered its Order concerning transportation costs on 
October 21, 1992, by this Final Order and Judgment: 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with 
prejudice. 
2. Defendants are awarded Three Million Six Hundred 
Thirty-one Thousand Six Hundred Fifteen Dollars and 53/100 
cents ($3,631,615.53) for unpaid royalties and interest in the 
amount of Two Million Seventy Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-five 
Dollars and 93/100 cents ($2,070,955.93) for a total judgment 
of Five Million Seven Hundred Two Thousand Five Hundred 
Seventy-one Dollars and 46/100 cents ($5,702,571.46). 
DATED this JS"^ day of November, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Gayle Qf. McKeachnie 
Attorneys for Defendants Recorded in Judrnent Record 
McKeachnie & Allred \J ?:^~?« ^-\((T\ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed in the U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT this $3^ day of November, 1992, to 
the following: 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Utah S t a t e At torney General 
Stephen G. Boyden 
A s s i s t a n t At torney General 
124 S t a t e C a p i t o l 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114 
Gayle F. McKeachnie 
Clark B. A l l r e d 
McKeachnie & A l l r e d 
363 East Main S t r e e t 
Vernal , Utah 84 078 
<£dUb*d -&x£x>^ 
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MINERAL LBA3I APPLICATION MINERAL LEASE NO ^•C>>< M 
GRANT S c h o o l 
>m 32603 
Utah State Lease for 
COAL 
THIS INDENTURE OF LEASE AND AOREEMENT entered into in duplicate this B*fr day of ^ b l l K r y ^
 J 0 6 5 ^ 
by and between the STATE LAND BOARD, acting in behalf of the State of Utah, hereinafter called die Leasor, and 
MALCOLM N. McJCIKMOM 
1222 South Hain Street 
Salt U k t City. Utah 84101 
party of the second part, hereinafter called the Leasee, under and Pursuant to Title 65, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
WITNESSETH: That the Leasor, in consideration of the rents and royalrjee to be paid and the covenants to be observed by the Lessee, as here-
inaftar sat forth, does hereby gram and lease to the Leasee the exclusive right and privilege to mine, remove, and dupose of all of the 
said minerals aw upon, or under the following described tract of land situated in EcCTy County, State of Utah, co-wit 
All of Section Thirty-eix (3o) , Tovmihi Seventeen (17) Sou:li, Rcnge 
Si* (C) EAjt, Salt Lake Meridian, 
contatninf a total of ***y * W acres, more or lees, together with the right to use and occupy so much of the surface o( said land as 
may be required for all purposes reasonably incident to the mining, removal, and disposal of said minerals, according to the provisions of this 
lease, for the penod ending sen jmm after the. first day of January next mcrsoriing the darn hereof and as long thereafter u said minerals may 
be produced in cnsnnwrial eajantfcjat from aaie] lands, or Leasee shall continue to make the payments required by Article III hereof, upon 
condinon thai at the and of aadi twenty (JO) ftat penod succeeding the first day of the year tn which this lease, is issued, such readjustment 
of terms and conditions may W «UMH as she lass or may determine to be neceaaary in the interest of rhe State 
ARTJCLBf 
This Lease • gieamd naUeet hi all respects to and under the conditions of the Laws of the State of Utah and existing rules and regulations 
and such operating nates and regulaHons at may be hereafter approved and adopted by the State Land Board. 
ARTICLE fl 
True lease covers only rhe mining, removal, and disposal of the minerals specified in true lease, but the Lessee shall promptly notify the 
thy 11senr of aha discovery of any minerals excepting those enumerated herein. 
ArncLEm 
Th» Lanaa> In consideration at* the granting of tha rights and privileges aforaaaid, hereby covenants and agrees as follows: 
FIRSTi To pay to die Lessor as rental for the land covered by this lease the sum of fifty (50) cents per acre per annum. All such annual 
payments of rental shall be made in advance on the 2nd day of January of each year, except the 12&5 rental which is payable 
on the execution of this lease All rentals aha 11 be credited against royalties for the year in which they accrue 
SECOND* To pay to Lessor quarterly,- on or before the 15th day of oSe month wrreeding each quarter, royalty 
(a) at the rate of 15/ per tew of 2000 lbs. of coal produced from the leased premamea and sold or otherwise disposed of, or 
(b) at tha rata arerailing, at the beginning of the quarter for which payment is being made, for federal leasees) of land of similar char-
i acaet under coal leasee anued by tha United States at that time, — __ 
whichever « higher, and, commencing with the year beginning tha January 1 following two yean from tha data hereof, to pay annual royalty 
of at least $1.00 multiplied by the number of acres hereby leased regard lees of actual production, provided mat Lessor may, at any time after 
the tenth anniversary data hereof, increase tha minimum annual royalty by not so exceed 50%.' 
If the cad produced (roam the keeed prermfcts a) washed before atle or other dfcpeeetion be Leeea*, Lessee may pt? iwraf*? • » w* « M w i 
product only, provided U r n tMlotainj accurate record by which the weight of weened co*J orspneting from the Ueeed pretties CM ba 
ascertained and coampike with ell resjulariona end directives ueued by Leeaor to prevent wast* and to insure that royalty • pead ea al weaned 
coaJ orientating froai she Ueeed arsmisaa, 
THIRD: To prepare end forward to the State lend Office, on or before die 15th day of the month next succeeding die quarter as which 
the materia] ta produced, e certifled statement oi die amount of production of all of the keeed sucettneae disposed of froai end landa, tod 
such other additional informerion ea the State Lend Board may from tune to rime require. 
FOURTH: To keep at die mine office deer, accurate and detailed mapa on tracing doth, en a acale not more then 30 feet to die tack* 
oi die workings in each aection of the leased landa and on die landa adjacent, aatd mapa to be coordinated with reference to a public land car-
rier ao that they can ba readily and correctly superimposed, and to fin rath to the Lessor annually, or upon demand, certified cop** of audi 
mapa and auch written etatementa of operations aa may ba called for. All surveys ahall be made by a licensed engineer and aQ mapa certified 
to by rum. 
FIFTH• Not to fence or otherwise make tnacceaaibe to arock any watering place on die premaiee without first obtaining die written content 
of Leaaor, nor to permit or contribute to die pollution of any aurface or subsurface water available or capable of being made available for domestic 
or irrigation use, 
SIXTH. Not to aaeign thia leaae or any interest therein, nor sublet any portion of die leaaed premise*, or any of die nghts and pmnleges 
herein granted, without the written content of the Leaaor being first had and obtained 
ARTICLE IV 
The Leaaor hereby excepts and reaervea from the operation of tha leaae: 
FIRST The right to permit for joint or several use auch easement! or rights-of-way upon, through, or in the land hereby leaaed aa may 
be necessary or appropriate to die working of theae or other landa belonging to or administered by die Lessor containing mineral deposta 
or for other use 
SECOND The right to use, lease, sell, or otherwise dupoae oi die surface oi said landa or any part thereof, under existing State laws 
or laws hereafter enacted, insofar as said surface ta not necessary for the Lesee in the mining, removal, or disposal of the leaaed substances there-
in, and to lease mineral deposits, other than those leaaed hereby, which may be contained in said landa ao long aa the recovery of such ds» 
poaita does not unreasonably interfere with Leasee's rights herein granted. 
ARTICLE V 
Upon failure or refusal of the Lessee to accept the readjustment of terms and conditions demanded by die Lessor at rhe end of any twenty* 
year period, such failure or refusal shall work a forfeiture of die lease and the same shall be canceled. 
ARTICLE VI 
In caae of expiration, forfeiture, surrender or other rermmanon of this leaae, all underground timbering supports, shaft linings, rails and 
other installanons necessary for the support of underground workings of any mines, and all rails or head frames and all instailanons which 
cannot be removed without permanent injury to the premises and all construction and equipment installed underground to provide ventilation 
for any mines, upon or in the said lands shall be and remain a part of the realty and shall revert to the Lessor without further consideration or 
compentanon and shall be left by rhe Lessee in the lands. 
All personal property of Lessee located within or upon the said lands, and all buildings, machinery, equipment and tools (other than the 
installations to become the property of Lessor as above provided), shall be and remain the property of Lessee and Lessee shall be enntied to, 
and may, within six (6) months after such expiranon, forfeiture, surrender or other termmanon of said lease, or within such extension of 
rime aa may be granted by Leaaor, remove from die said landa such personal property and improvements, other than those items which sre 
to remain rhe property of the Lector at above provided. 
Leasee shall, upon terralTietJon, of_rhsj keac or abandonment of the leaaed premise for any reason, seal to Lessor's satisfaction all or such 
part of xht mine openings on die premises at Leaaor shall request be sealed. 
ARTICLE VII 
It shall be the responsibility of the Leaeee to dope die sides of all operations of a surface nature to an angle of not less than 4S* or to 
erect a barrier around auch operation at die State Land Board may require. Such sloping or fencing shall become a normal part of rhe opera-
son of die leas* so aa to keep pace widi such operation to the extent that such operation ahall not coneutute a hazard 
ARTICLE v m 
Leani shall not sell or otherwise dispose oi any water rights acquired for use upon die leased premises except with Lessor's written per-
aaaatatn. Upon atrminatioo oi thia leaae for any reason, aQ such rights acquired by application to die Utah State Engineer ahall revert » the 
Leaaor aa an appurtenance to the leaaed premises, and aQ such righo acquired by other means shall be offered to Leaaor in writing for puidiees 
at Leasee's acq nasi t ion coats, provided that Leaaor shall be deemed to have rejected such offer if k does not accept the tame widun thirty 
earyt after feceeet ineieof. 
ARTrCLEBC 
AQ of rhe terms, covenants, condinona, and obligations m this lease contained, shall be bmding upon the heirs, executors, sdmamstratora, 
end assigns ef the l i s t s i , 
ARTICLE* 
lias11 may terminate uSas leaae at any time upon giving ehree (J) months' notice in writing to die Leeaor and upon payment of aQ 
rents and royalties] and other tame due end parable m die Leaaor, and upon complying with die terms of due leeee with respect to die preser-
vation ef me working* in such order and condition at to permit of die continued operation oi the leaeed premiaea. 
ARTICLE n 
Lessor, its officers and agents, shall have die right at aQ rimes to go in and upon die leaaed lands and premiaea, during die term of said 
leaae to inspect die work done and rhe progress thereof on ttad lands and die products obtained nSerefrom, and to post any notices on die 
said lend diet it may deem fit and proper; and alao shall permit any authorised representatives oi die Leaaor to eaaamine ail books and records 
pertaining to operaaons under due leaae, and to make copies of and extracts from die same, sf desired. 
ARTICLE XH 
That kese is issued only under such ntle as die State of Utah may now hold* and that in die event die State is hereafter divested oi such 
tkW, the Lessor shall not be liable for any damages sustained by die Leasee, not shall die Leasee be entited to or claim any refund ot rcntaJt 
or loyalties or other monies dieietofcie paid to the Lessor. 
ARTICLE Xu7 
17 the Leaeee shall initiate or establish sny water right on the leaaed premises, such right, shall become aa appurtenance ot the leased-
~SM—iata- anal, apon the termination of the lease, the Lessee shall convey the right to the Lessor. 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE LAND BOASD 
*~/t ^ yj^iA. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
On the day of 
} - LESSEE'S INDIVIDUAL AOCNOWLEDGEMENT 
19_ personally appeared before me 
the signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to OM that 
Given under my hand and teal this day of 
executed the 
19-
My commission Expires: "Notary Public, residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
LESSEE'S CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
On the day of personally appeared before me 
who being duly sworn did say that he is an officer of . 
MI behalf of said corporation by resolution of its Board of Directors, and aerd 
edged to me that aaid ceenararJon executed the same. 
and that said instrument waa 
admowl 
Orven under my hand and seal this . day of 19-
Ul Expiree* Notary t\Mic, residing at: 
STATI Of UTAH 
COUNTY OT SALT LUC1 } • 
f On the f&L— day of ^JJ/AU.L » 19&U., prrwinaOy appeared before me Max C Gardner, who being by me dnry SWOTL 
aUsf m\ that he » the Director of the State Land Board of the State of Utah and that said instrument was signed in behalf of aud Board by 
a/ the Board. **d said Max C Gardner acknowledged to me that saad Board executed the tame ui behalf of the Stale of Utah. 
ondor say hand and seal dm — j l Z - day of ^f/tfUsJ* *6S~ 
• & * - « ^ ' 
6 d I 4 A 4MM 4S IK*miitU 
VCT***" jr> ^ -7£^y? 
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UTAH ENABLING ACT 
Utah Enabling Act, §6: 
That upon the admission of said State into the Union, 
sections numbered two, sixteen, thirty-two, and thirty-
six in every township of said proposed state, and where 
such sections, or any parts thereof have been sold or 
otherwise disposed of by or under the authority of any 
Act of Congress, other lands equivalent thereto, in legal 
subdivisions of not less than one quarter section and as 
contiguous as may be to the section in lieu of which the 
same is taken, are hereby granted to said State for the 
support of common schools.... 
Utah Enabling Act §10: 
That the proceeds of lands herein granted for educational 
purposes, except as hereinafter otherwise provided, shall 
constitute a permanent school fund, the interest of which 
only shall be expended for the support of said schools, 
and such land shall not be subject to pre-emption, 
homestead entry, or any other entry under the land laws 
of the United States, whether surveyed or unsurveyed, but 
shall be surveyed for school purposes only. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Utah Constitution, Article X, §5: 
The proceeds of the sale of lands reserved by an Act of 
Congress, approved February 21st, 1855, for the 
establishment of the University of Utah, and of all the 
lands granted by an Act of Congress, approved July 16th, 
1894, shall constitute permanent funds, to be safely 
invested and held by the State; and the income thereof 
shall be used exclusively for the support and maintenance 
of the different institutions and colleges, respectively, 
in accordance with the requirements and conditions of 
said Acts of Congress. 
(Article X was amended, effectively July 1, 1987, with Section 5 
becoming Sections 5 and 7). 
Utah Constitution, Article X, §5: 
(1) There is established a permanent State School Fund 
which shall consist of revenue from the following 
sources: (a) proceeds from sales of all lands granted by 
the United States to this state for the support of the 
public elementary and secondary schools; (b) 5% of the 
net proceeds from the sales of United States public lands 
lying within this state; (c) all revenues derived from 
non-renewable resources on school or state lands, other 
than those lands granted for other specific purposes; and 
(d) other revenues as appropriated by the Legislature. 
The State School Fund principal shall be safely invested 
and held by the state in perpetuity. The interest of the 
State School Fund only shall be expended for the support 
of the public elementary and secondary schools. The 
Legislature by statute may provide for necessary 
administrative costs. The State School Fund shall be 
guaranteed by the state against loss or diversion. 
Utah Constitution, Article XX, §1: 
All lands of the State that have been, or may hereafter 
be granted to the State by Congress, and all lands 
acquired by gift, grant or devise, from any person or 
corporation, or that may otherwise be acquired, are 
hereby accepted, and declared to be the public lands of 
the State; and shall be held in trust for the people, to 
be disposed of as may be provided by law, for the 
respective purposes for which they have been or may be 
granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-1 (1953 as amended): 
(1) (a) On the effective date of this act, the Board of 
State Lands shall be increased in membership from eight 
to nine members comprised as follows: one member is to be 
the state superintendent of public instruction, or such 
other person designated by the State Board of Education, 
one member knowledgeable in matters pertaining to 
forestry and fire control, and each of the remaining 
seven members are to be representative of one of the 
following districts: 
District 1 - Box Elder, Cache, Weber, and Davis Counties; 
District 2 - Beaver, Garfield, Iron, Kane, and Washington 
Counties; 
District 3 - Summit, Rich, Morgan, and Wasatch Counties; 
District 4 - Juab, Millard, Piute, Sanpete, Sevier, and 
Wayne Counties; 
District 5 - Carbon, Emery, Grand, and San Juan Counties; 
District 6 - Daggett, Duchesne, and Uintah Counties; 
District 7 - Utah, Salt Lake, and Tooele Counties, 
(b) The incumbent appointed members of the board 
shall remain as members of the board for the balance of 
the terms of office for which they were appointed. The 
governor shall appoint the member of the board 
representing district 3, with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, to a term of office expiring on March 1, 
1987. 
(2) Upon expiration of the terms of office of the 
incumbent appointed members of the board or the one 
member appointed under Subsection (1)(b), their 
successors shall be appointed by the governor, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, from each of the 
districts provided for in Subsection (1)(a), and shall be 
appointed for terms of office of four years each. Not 
more than four members shall be from the same political 
party. Vacancies occurring among the appointed members 
of the board by reason of death, resignation, or other 
cause shall be filled by the appointment of another 
person by the governor, with the advise and consent of 
the Senate, for the unexpired term of the person whose 
office was vacated and shall be from the district 
provided for in Subsection (1)(a) as to which the vacancy 
has thus occurred. 
(3) Upon the first expiration of terms of appointed 
members following the effective date of this act, and 
thereafter one of the successors appointed under 
Subsection (2) of this section shall be actively engaged 
in a livestock grazing operation using state lands. 
(4) The board shall appoint its chairman from its 
membership, and five members of the board shall 
constitute a quorum for the transaction of business and 
for the holding of hearings. 
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-18(3) (1953 as amended): 
The form of all applications, mineral leases, and other 
relevant instruments shall be prescribed by the board. 
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-23 (1953 as amended): 
Except as otherwise provided by law, the State Land Board 
shall by rules and regulations prescribe the form of 
application, the form of lease, the annual rental, the 
amount of royalty and the basis upon which the royalty 
shall be computed, and such other details as it may deem 
necessary in the interest of the state. 
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-76 (1953 as amended): 
All leases and contracts of every kind entered into by 
the State Land Board shall before execution by such board 
be approved as to form by the attorney general. 
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-97 (1953 as amended): 
The State Land Board may make and enforce rules and 
regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
act for carrying the same into effect. 
Utah Code Ann., §65A-l-2(3) (1953 as amended): 
(a) Policies shall be consistent with the Utah Enabling 
Act, the Utah Constitution, and state law. 
(b) The board shall adopt rules under Title 63, Chapter 
46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, necessary to 
fulfill the purposes of this title. 
Utah Code Ann., §78-2-2(3) (f) and (j) (1953 as amended): 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review 
informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under 
Subsection (e); 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record 
over which the Court of Appeals does not have original 
appellate jurisdiction. 
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED 
30 U.S.C. §207 (a): 
[A] lease shall require payment of a royalty in such 
amount as the Secretary shall determine of not less than 
12 1/2 per centum of the value of coal as defined by 
regulation, except the Secretary may determine a lesser 
amount in the case of coal recovered by underground 
mining operations.,.. 
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
43 C.F.R. §3473.3-2: 
2. A lease shall require payment of a royalty of not 
less than 12 1/2 percent of the value of the coal removed 
from a surface mine. 
3. A lease shall require payment of royalty of not less 
than 8 percent of the value of the coal removed from an 
underground mine, except that the authorized officer 
(Minerals Management Service) may determine a lesser 
amount, but in no case less than 5 percent if conditions 
warrant. 
RULES & REGULATIONS GOVERNING 
THE ISSUANCE OF MINERAL LEASES 
of the Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry 
and the Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry 
Revised to Include Amendments Effective: November 4, 1982 
Rule 3(C)(2) An overdue royalty fee of 1.5% per month 
shall be charged on any amounts of production royalty 
which are owing the State and have not been paid within 
the time limit specified in the mineral lease under which 
such production royalty is due. 
Revised to Include Amendments Effective: December 26, 1983 
Rule 3(C)(2) Payment of a 6% penalty fee shall be 
required of lessee on all delinquent royalty. In 
addition, lessee shall be required to pay lessor interest 
fees of 1.5 % per month on all amounts of outstanding 
overdue royalty. 
Revised to Include Amendments Effective: July 1, 1986 
Rule M3a2(5)(f) Interest shall be compounded 
semiannually based on the average adjusted prime rate, 
rounded to the nearest full percent, for each six-month 
period computed from April to September and October to 
March (as published by the Internal Revenue Service), 
plus four percent (4%) . The interest rate will be 
subject to change at six-month intervals every July 1st, 
and January 1st, This interest rate will be applied to 
any delinquent royalty and will be in effect until 
payment is received. 
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scribed in section 59-l-401(3)(a) and states 
in pertinent part: "The penalty for under-
payment of tax is as follows: (a) If any 
underpayment of tax is due to negligence 
the penalty is 10% of the underpayment" 
The Tax Commission found that Tummur-
ru's failure to collect and pay the sales 
taxes was due to negligence. It is within 
the discretion of the Tax Commission 
whether to assess penalties for failure to 
pay taxes.13 The findings of the Tax Com-
mission will not be overturned on appeal 
unless the party challenging the findings 
can show that they are contrary to law or 
otherwise erroneous.14 
Tummurru has not upheld its burden on 
appeal to show that the Tax Commission 
erred with regard to the assessment of the 
sales taxes, interest, and penalties. The 
decision and order of the Tax Commission 
are affirmed. 
HOWE, Associate C.J., and STEWART, 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
13. See Robert H. Hinckley, Inc. v. State Tax Div., 
17 Utah 2d 70, 404 P.2d 662, 669 (Utah 1965). 
14. See, e.g., Benevolent and Protective Order of 
Elks No. 85 v. Tax Comm'n, 536 P.2d 1214, 1219 
PLATEAU MINING COIVIPANY, a Dela. 
ware Corporation, and Cyprus Western 
Coal Equipment Company, a Delaware 
Corporation, Plaintiffs and Appellees 
v. 
The UTAH DIVISION OF STATE LANDS 
AND FORESTRY, Ralph Miles, Di-
rector of the Division of State Lands 
and Forestry, Utah Department of Nat-
ural Resources, Dee Hansen, Executive 
Director of the Utah Department of 
Natural Resources, Defendants and Ap-
pellants. 
BLACKHAWK COAL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
The UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY, et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY, 
The Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining 
Company, Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
The UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY, et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
The UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY, et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Nos. 880120, 880215, 880243 and 880300. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 20, 1990. 
Mining companies brought actions for 
declaratory judgments against Division of 
(Utah 1975); Butler v. State Tax Comm'n, 13 
Utah 2d 1, 367 P.2d 852, 853 (1962); McKen-
drick v. State Tax Comm'n, 9 Utah 2d 418, 347 
P.2d 177, 178 (1959). 
PLATEAU MIN. v. UTAH 
Cite as 802 P.2d 
State Lands and Forestry for an adjudica-
tion of liability under royalty provisions of 
coal leases. The Seventh District, Carbon 
County, Boyd Bunnell, J., entered summary 
judgment in favor of the companies. State 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., 
held that: (1) material issues of fact pre-
cluded summary judgment on issues of 
whether prevailing federal rate was higher, 
and thus whether companies breached their 
duty to pay at the higher rate; (2) evidence 
did not support estopping the State from 
seeking to collect at a higher rate; (3) 
companies would be given opportunity to 
present evidence which would support a 
finding of estoppel; (4) State's interpreta-
tion and attempted application of lease did 
not amount to rule making; and (5) State 
was not barred from recovery by laches. 
Reversed and remanded. 
DIV. OF STATE LANDS Utah 721 
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mining parties' intent from parol evidence 
1. Appeal and Error e=842(2), 863 
Supreme Court will review the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment for 
correctness, giving no particular deference 
to the trial court's conclusions of law. 
2. Judgment <3=>183 
The filing of cross motions for summa-
ry judgment does not necessarily mean 
that material issues of fact do not exist 
3. Contracts <3=>152 
The plain meaning rule preserves the 
intent of the parties and protects a contract 
against judicial revision. 
4. Evidence <3=>448 
While parol evidence is generally not 
admissible to explain the intent of a con-
tract which is clear on its face, if a contract 
is ambiguous, parol evidence is admissible 
to explain the parties' intent. 
5. Contracts <s=>176(2) 
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a 
question of law which must be decided 
before parol evidence is admitted. 
6. Contracts <3=>176(2) 
When an ambiguity in a contract ex-
ists, the intent of the parties is a question 
°f fact to be determined by the jury, and 
failure to resolve an ambiguity by deter-
IS error. 
7. Contracts <S=>170(1) 
If a contract is ambiguous, the court 
may consider the parties' actions and per-
formance as evidence of the parties' true 
intention. 
8. Contracts <S=>143(2) 
A contract provision is not necessarily 
ambiguous just because one party gives 
that provision a different meaning than 
another party does, but rather to demon-
strate ambiguity, contrary positions of the 
parties must each be tenable. 
9. Mines and Minerals <3=>5.2(1) 
Ambiguity in alternative royalty provi-
sion in coal leases should not have ended 
the trial court's inquiry into the alternative 
provision, but rather, the trial court should 
have received evidence to determine the 
meaning of the terms in the provision. 
10. Mines and Minerals <3=>5.2(1) 
Alternative rate provision in coal leas-
es were not unenforceable on basis of am-
biguity, even if extrinsic evidence had been 
adduced to determine how federal rate 
should be calculated, what the federal rate 
was, and when it became prevailing; alter-
native rate provision was based on prevail-
ing federal rate clause and provided a prac-
ticable method by which appropriate royal-
ty could be determined. 
11. Contracts e=>228 
An agreement which sets a price that 
is determined by factors outside the con-
tract, such as a market price or the price in 
another contract, is valid and enforceable. 
12. Mines and Minerals <s=5.2(l) 
State's acceptance of lower royalty 
payments under coal leases was not a prac-
tical construction of the leases by the State 
that the lower royalty rate was rate the 
lessees should pay, in that lessees were 
responsible for calculating alternative fed-
eral prevailing royalty payments for royal-
ty reporting form that they had to submit 
to the State, and State had a right to rely 
on good faith of its lessees in calculating 
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the royalty and submitting the required 
information. 
13. Mines and Minerals <3=>5.2(1) 
Alternative royalty provision in coal 
leases required lessees to determine wheth-
er prevailing federal rate was higher and to 
pay at that rate, and did not require any 
affirmative action by State; lessees cove-
nanted and agreed to pay whichever rate 
was higher and were required to prepare 
and forward a certified statement of 
amount of production, and determinations 
"of lessees were not binding on the State. 
14. Estoppel <s=>62.2(2) 
State would not be estopped from col-
lecting increased royalties under alterna-
tive rate provision in coal leases unless 
injustice would result and there would be 
no substantial adverse effect on public poli-
cy. 
15. Estoppel e=62.2(2) 
There was no injustice in requiring 
coal companies which leased coal mines to 
pay royalties at prevailing federal rate, un-
der alternative royalty provision, and thus 
State would not be estopped from seeking 
to collect increased royalties on that basis; 
lessees knew that the leases required them 
to pay at the "prevailing" rate. 
16. Public Lands <s>51 
State acts as a trustee and its duties 
are the same as the duties of other trustees 
when the State is administering school 
trust lands. 
17. Public Lands <3=>54(6) 
State's duty of loyalty to beneficiaries 
of school trust lands includes the duty not 
to act in the interest of a third party at the 
expense of the beneficiaries by disposing of 
trust property for less than the agreed 
price. 
18. Estoppel <^62.2(2) 
State would not be estopped from ob-
taining royalty payments at prevailing fed-
eral rate from coal companies under alter-
native rate provision in coal leases on 
school trust land; there was no injustice in 
requiring the companies to pay royalties at 
prevailing federal rate when they knew 
that lease required them to pay at such 
rate, to estop the State would be to contra-
vene the important public policy that State 
should recover full value from lease of 
school trust land, State's acceptance of low. 
er rate was not inconsistent with lease pro-
vision, and companies were not without 
fault, evidence did not indicate. 
19. Mines and Minerals <S=>5.2(1) 
Trial court, on remand of action seek-
ing determination of liability of coal compa-
nies to pay increased royalty payments to 
State under coal leases, would be required 
to determine prevailing federal rate for 
land of similar character; alternative rate 
provision provided for payment of prevail-
ing federal rate. 
20. Estoppel ®=>62.2(2) 
Coal companies would be given oppor-
tunity on remand to present evidence which 
would support a finding that State should 
be estopped from seeking to collect in-
creased royalties under alternative rate 
provision in coal leases due to past accept-
ance of lower royalties. 
21. Estoppel <S=>52.10(3) 
Mere silence is not a waiver unless 
there is some duty or obligation to speak. 
22. Estoppel <s=>62.2(2) 
State's acceptance of royalty payments 
under coal leases in amounts less than the 
amount owed did not waive State's right to 
seek to collect full payment. 
23. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=*383 
Mines and Minerals ®=>5.2(1) 
State's interpretation of coal leases to 
require increased payments under alterna-
tive royalty provision was not a new royal-
ty policy for which the State was required 
to comply with procedures of Administra-
tive Rulemaking Act U.C.A.1953, 63-
46a-l to 63-46a-16, 63-46a-2(8)(a), (14). 
24. Equity <S=>72(1) 
"Laches," which bars a recovery when 
there has been a delay by one party caus-
ing a disadvantage to the other party, re* 
quires a lack of diligence on the part of the 
PLATEAU MIN. v. UTAH 
Cite as 802 P-2d 
claimant and an injury to the defendant 
because of a lack of diligence. 
Sec publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
25. Mines and Minerals e=>5.2(l) 
State was not barred from recovery of 
increased royalty fees under coal leases by 
doctrine of laches; lessee defaulted in per-
formance of duty to pay at prevailing fed-
eral rate. 
26. Mines and Minerals <S=>5.2(1) 
Trial court on remand was required to 
consider whether coal company could be 
liable for delinquent interest and penalties 
for failing to pay proper royalty under coal 
leases. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Gayle F. McKeachnie, 
Clark B. Allred, David S. Christensen, Salt 
Lake City, for Utah State Lands and For-
estry. 
James M. Elegante, Patricia J. Winmill, 
Lucy B. Jenkins, Kenneth R. Barrett, Salt 
Lake City, for Plateau Min. Co. 
Hugh C. Garner, Salt Lake City, for 
Blackhawk Coal Co. 
Keith E. Taylor, Patricia J. Winmill, Lucy 
B Jenkins, Kenneth R. Barrett, Salt Lake 
City, for Consolidation Coal Co. 
Calvin L. Rampton, Richard B. Johns, 
Salt Lake City, for Trail Mountain Coal Co. 
STEWART, Justice: 
The plaintiffs in this consolidated case, 
four mining companies, brought actions for 
declaratory judgments against the Utah Di-
vision of State Lands and Forestry (the 
"State") for an adjudication of their liabili-
ty under the royalty provisions of certain 
coal leases. The State appeals summary 
judgments in favor of the four mining com-
panies. 
I. FACTS 
The issues in each of these consolidated 
cases arise out of the same standard lease 
form. The leased land is school trust land. 
DIV. OF STATE LANDS Utah 723 
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A brief explanation of the nature of school 
trust lands provides a background for the 
application of the governing legal princi-
ples. When Utah became a state, the Unit-
ed States granted lands to the State for the 
support of the common schools. Utah En-
abling Act §§ 6, 10, 28 Stat. ch. 138, at 107 
(1894). The state of Utah accepted those 
lands for that purpose. Utah Const, art. 
XX, § 1. 
The Utah Division of State Lands and 
Forestry is charged with the duty of admin-
istering those lands. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 65-1-14 (1986).» The State leased lands 
located in Carbon and Emery Counties for 
the mining of coal to the predecessor of 
Plateau Mining Company in 1965, the 
predecessor of Blackhawk Coal Company in 
1960, the predecessor of Consolidation Coal 
Company in 1968, and the predecessor of 
Trail Mountain Coal Company in 1965. 
A standard lease form prepared by the 
State was used in each of the transactions. 
It authorized the lessee to extract coal in 
exchange for a royalty specified in Article 
III of the lease. The royalty provision 
states: 
The Lessee, in consideration of the grant-
ing of the rights and privileges aforesaid, 
hereby covenants and agrees as follows: 
SECOND: To pay to Lessor quarterly, 
on or before the 15th day of the month 
succeeding each quarter, royalty 
(a) at the rate of 15c per ton of 2000 
lbs. of coal produced from the leased 
premises and sold or otherwise disposed 
of, or 
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the begin-
ning of the quarter for which payment is 
being made, for federal lessees of land of 
similar character under coal leases issued 
by the United States at that time, which-
ever is higher 
The lease also stated: "This lease is 
granted subject in all respects to and under 
the conditions of the laws of the State of 
Utah and existing rules and regulations 
and such operating rules and regulations 
as may be hereafter approved and adopted 
!
- Currently Utah Code Ann. §§ 65A-1-4, -4-3, -7-1 (Supp.1990). 
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by the State Land Board." The lessee was 
required to prepare and submit quarterly 
to the State a certified statement reporting 
the amount of production of the mine and 
any other information the State required. 
Plaintiffs mined coal under these leases 
during various periods and paid royalties 
under paragraph "second," subdivision (a) 
of the leases. The royalty reporting forms 
provided by the State required a report of 
"Royalty Data," on a form which had two 
columns that corresponded to the alterna-
tive royalty provisions, one headed "c/T 
Basis" (i.e. cents per ton) and the other 
"Percentage Basis." Each column provid-
ed the formula for calculating a royalty on 
the basis stated. Throughout the entire 
term of these leases, plaintiffs completed 
the column entitled "e/T Basis" and paid 
the 15c per ton royalty except for Consoli-
dation, which paid at a rate of 17.5c per 
ton. The State accepted these statements 
and royalty payments without objection. 
The federal coal lease royalty rate gener-
ally remained at 15c per ton until 1976, 
when Congress enacted the Federal Coal 
Leasing Amendments Act, 90 Stat. 1083 
(1976). This Act allowed the Secretary of 
the Interior to promulgate regulations in-
creasing the federal royalty rate on newly 
issued leases of underground mines to 87f 
of the value of the coal produced. 43 
C.F.R. § 3473.3-2(a)(3) (1979). All the 
plaintiffs subsequently entered into leases 
with the federal government at the 87< 
rate. 
Although the federal rate had increased, 
the plaintiffs continued to pay royalties at 
the lower 15c per ton rate except that 
Consolidation paid 17.5c. In 1980, the 
State represented to Plateau that its lease 
was in good standing, and in May 1985, the 
State represented to Cyprus Western Coal 
Equipment Company, a successor to Pla-
teau, that Plateau royalty payments were 
current. Thereafter, Cyprus acquired Pla-
teau. 
However, in 1982 the State notified 
Blackhawk that it expected to receive "fu-
ture royalty payments at the same rate 
prevailing for similar federal coal leases in 
the area" under Article III, paragraph sec-
ond (b) of the lease. Blackhawk responded 
with a letter dated January 7,1982, statin? 
"Blackhawk will continue to pay to th 
State, on a quarterly basis, the royalty of 
15c per ton in compliance with Article IH(a\ 
of the original lease agreement, since the 
provisions of Article 111(b) are inapplicable 
at the present time." Blackhawk contin-
ued to pay the royalty at the rate of 1^ 
per ton until 1983, when the mine ceased 
production. 
In December 1984, the State began to 
audit its coal leases. The audit included an 
analysis of the United States Bureau of 
Land Management records on federal coal 
leases and an examination of the records of 
the state coal lessees. The auditors found 
that the royalty rate on newly issued feder-
al coal leases had increased to 8% in 1977 
and that the plaintiffs had failed to report 
and pay royalties at the higher federal 
rate. After further consideration by anoth-
er audit committee, the State demanded 
payment from the mining companies for 
delinquent royalties, interest, and penalties 
for the period April 1, 1979, to December 
31, 1984. The State demanded $2,991,-
613.44 from Plateau; $3,150,742.93 from 
Blackhawk; $197,193.09 from Consolida-
tion; and $5,222,197.20 from Trail Moun-
tain. 
The plaintiffs requested hearings before 
the Board of State Lands. Hearings were 
held, and the audit findings upheld. The 
plaintiffs then filed actions for declaratory 
judgments to declare the Board's decisions 
invalid. In the Trail Mountain case, Trail 
Mountain and the State stipulated that the 
Division of State Lands relied upon each 
coal lessee to provide accurate production 
and royalty information on the royalty re-
porting form. They also stipulated that 
after 1976, all new federal coal leases is-
sued for underground mines provided, with 
few exceptions, for an 8^ royalty rate, that 
most federal coal leases were readjusted 
between 1979 and 1985 and increased to a 
royalty rate of 8% of value, and that 
management at Trail Mountain was aware 
of the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments 
Act and the regulations promulgated pur-
suant to the Act. 
PLATEAU MIN. v. UTAH 
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In granting the plaintiffs summary judg-
ment, the trial court held that (1) the royal-
ty provision in each lease was ambiguous; 
(2) the plaintiffs were not required to deter-
mine and apply the correct royalty rate; (3) 
the State was estopped from collecting past 
royalties through a retroactive audit; and 
(4) the State could not collect interest and 
penalties from the mining companies. In 
short, the trial court ruled that the plain-
tiffs owed nothing under the terms of their 
leases. The State appealed. 
II. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 
[1,2] The trial court held as a matter of 
law that the alternative royalty provision in 
the lease, Article 111(b), was ambiguous 
and therefore unenforceable. We review 
the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment for correctness, giving no particular 
deference to the trial court's conclusions of 
law. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Pav-
ing, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 
(Utah 1989); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 
245, 247 (Utah 1988). In determining 
whether a material issue of fact exists, we 
do not defer to a trial court's conclusion on 
the matter. The filing of cross-motions for 
summary judgment does not necessarily 
mean that material issues of fact do not 
exist. Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design 
Assocs., 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1981). 
[3] In ruling that the alternative royal-
ty provision in Article 111(b) was unenforce-
able, the trial court departed from estab-
lished rules of contract interpretation. 
"The basic rule of contract interpretation is 
that the intent of the parties is to be ascer-
tained from the content of the instrument 
itself Each contract provision is to be 
considered in relation to all of the others, 
with a view toward giving effect to all and 
ignoring none." Utah Valley Bank v. 
Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 
1981); Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 
1107-08 (Utah 1982). The plain meaning 
rule preserves the intent of the parties and 
protects the contract against judicial revi-
s
*on. Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionameri-
ca, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982); 
Utah Valley Bank, 636 P.2d at 1061. 
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[4,5] Parol evidence is generally not 
admissible to explain the intent of a con-
tract which is clear on its face. Faulkner 
v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 
1983). But if a contract is ambiguous, 
parol evidence is admissible to explain the 
parties' intent. Colonial Leasing Co. v. 
Larsen Bros. Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483, 
487 (Utah 1986); Faulkner, 665 P.2d at 
1293. Whether a contract is ambiguous is 
a question of law which must be decided 
before parol evidence is admitted. Faulk-
ner, 66b P.2d at 1293. "[A] motion for 
summary judgment may not be granted if 
a legal conclusion is reached that an ambi-
guity exists in the contract and there is a 
factual issue as to what the parties intend-
ed." Id. 
[6,7] When ambiguity does exist, the 
intent of the parties is a question of fact to 
be determined by the jury. Colonial Leas-
ing Co., 731 P.2d at 488. Failure to re-
solve an ambiguity by determining the par-
ties' intent from parol evidence is error. 
Winegar v. Smith Inv. Co., 590 P.2d 348, 
350 (Utah 1979). If a contract is ambigu-
ous, the court may consider the parties' 
actions and performance as evidence of the 
parties' true intention. Zeese v. Estate of 
Siegel, 534 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah 1975); Bull-
frog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 
268, 501 P.2d 266, 271 (1972); Bullough v. 
Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 309, 400 P.2d 20, 23 
(1965). 
[8] The trial court held the royalty pro-
vision ambiguous because the amount due 
was "based on several factors not immedi-
ately capable of definitive determination." 
However, a contract provision is not neces-
sarily ambiguous just because one party 
gives that provision a different meaning 
than another party does. Buehner Block 
Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 
(Utah 1988). To demonstrate ambiguity, 
the contrary positions of the parties must 
each be tenable. See, e.g., Grow v. Mar-
wick Dev., Inc., 621 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah 
1980). Even if a provision is not "immedi-
ately capable of definitive determination," 
that does not necessarily make the provi-
sion unenforceable. 
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[9,10] Thus, ambiguity in the royalty 
provision in the leases should not have 
ended the inquiry. Rather, the trial court 
should have received evidence to determine 
the meaning of the terms in the provision. 
The language of the lease provision is 
clear. The intent of the parties was that 
the higher of the two rates should be paid 
the State. If ambiguity exists, it arises 
from the language that the "prevailing fed-
eral rate" shall be paid when it is higher 
than the c/T rate. Extrinsic evidence will, 
no doubt, have to be adduced to determine 
how that federal rate was to be calculated, 
what the rate was, and when it became 
"prevailing," if it did. 
It follows that the trial court should not 
have held the alternative rate provision un-
enforceable because it is ambiguous. Pro-
fessor Corbin states, "An agreement is not 
unenforceable for lack of definiteness of 
price or amount if the parties specify a 
practicable method by which the amount 
can be determined by the court without any 
new expression by the parties themselves." 
1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 98, at 
433-34 (1963). It is only necessary that 
there be a reasonable method by which the 
court can determine the amount owed. In 
Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 
1979), this Court stated on a somewhat 
related issue: 
We have no disagreement with the 
general proposition that a contract will 
not be specifically enforced unless the 
obligations of the parties are "set forth 
with sufficient definiteness that it can be 
performed." But to be considered there-
with is the further proposition that the 
parties to a contract are obliged to pro-
ceed in good faith to cooperate in per-
forming the contract in accordance with 
its expressed intent. A contract is not 
fatally defective as to price if there is an 
agreement as to some formula or method 
for fixing it. 
595 P.2d at 859 (quoting Bunnell v. Bills, 
13 Utah 2d 83, 86, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (1962)) 
(footnotes omitted). 
[11] Thus, an agreement which sets a 
price that is determined by factors outside 
the contract, such as a market price or the 
price in another contract, is valid and en-
forceable. States Marine Lines, Inc.
 v 
Crooks, 13 N.Y.2d 206, 218-14, 245 Ny 
S.2d 581, 586-87, 195 N.E.2d 296, 3OQ 
(1963); Bruce v. Blalock, 241 S.C. 155, 127 
S.E.2d 439 (1962); Combs v. Frigid Foods 
Products, Inc., 67 Wash.2d 862, 866, 4io 
P.2d 780, 782 (1966). Indeed, the validity 
of leases calling for royalties based on mar-
ket price does not appear to be at issue in 
most cases. See Foster v. Atlantic Refin-
ing Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.1964); 
Holmes v. Kewanee Oil Co., 233 Kan. 544, 
664 P.2d 1335 (1983), cert, denied, 474 U.s! 
953, 106 S.Ct. 322, 88 L.Ed.2d 305 (1985); 
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 
866 (Tex.1968); State v. Moncrief, 720 P.2d 
470 (Wyo.1986). 
The alternative rate provision, based on 
the prevailing federal rate clause, provides 
a practicable method by which the appro-
priate royalty can be determined. In 1976, 
Congress enacted the Federal Coal Leasing 
Amendments Act, which provides in part: 
A lease shall require payment of a royal-
ty in such amount as the Secretary shall 
determine of not less than 12V2 per cen-
tum of the value of coal as defined by 
regulation, except the Secretary may de-
termine a lesser amount in the case of 
coal recovered by underground mining 
operations. 
30 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1988). The regulations 
promulgated under the Act provide: 
(a)(1) Royalty rates shall be determined 
on an individual case basis prior to lease 
issuance. For competitive leases, initial 
royalty rates shall be set out in the no-
tice of lease sale. 
(2) A lease shall require payment of a 
royalty of not less than I2V2 percent of 
the value of the coal removed from a 
surface mine. 
(3) A lease shall require payment of a 
royalty of not less than 8 percent of the 
value of coal removed from an under-
ground mine, except that the authorized 
officer may determine a lesser amount, 
but in no case less than 5 percent if 
conditions warrant. 
43 C.F.R. § 3473.3-2 (1989). 
The alternative rate provision is suffi-
ciently clear to be enforceable. If there is 
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ambiguity as to how the prevailing federal 
^te clause should be applied, the trial 
court should admit parol evidence to clarify 
its construction. The trial court's granting 
of plaintiffs' motions for summary judg-
ment under these circumstances was inap-
propriate. 
Consolidation asserts that it agreed with 
the State in 1981 that the prevailing federal 
rate was 17.5c per ton, the same as in its 
federal lease at the time. If such an agree-
ment were made, it may be relevant to the 
interpretation of the prevailing federal rate 
provision, as it applies to Consolidation. 
Consolidation also asserts that its agree-
ment fixed the rate at 17.5c until readjust-
ment in January 1988. Because the matter 
was decided on a motion for summary judg-
ment, the trial court did not determine 
whether the parties entered into such an 
agreement, and our review of the record 
does not reveal any evidence which sup-
ports Consolidation's claim that the rate 
was fixed until 1988. The matter may, of 
course, be decided in a trial on the merits. 
[12] Evidence of the parties' course of 
conduct might also be relevant. The plain-
tiffs argue, and the trial court held, that 
the parties established a course of conduct 
to the effect that royalty payments should 
be based on the 15c-per-ton rate, the impli-
cation being that the parties adopted a 
construction of the lease contrary to the 
prevailing federal rate provision. The 
State's acceptance of the lower rate, how-
ever, does not show a practical construction 
of the lease by the State that the lower 
royalty rate was the rate the plaintiffs 
should pay. The plaintiffs were respon-
sible for calculating the alternative federal 
prevailing royalty payments for the royalty 
reporting form that they had to submit to 
the State. The State had a right to rely on 
the good faith of its lessees in calculating 
the royalty and submitting the required 
information. 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs' argument, if 
accepted, would in effect read the alterna-
tive royalty provision out of the lease. The 
doctrine of practical construction can have 
n<> such force on these facts. Professor 
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Corbin has explained the governing princi-
ples: 
There are many other bases of [con-
tract] interpretation besides the practical 
application base. The present doctrine 
does not cause them to be discarded; 
indeed, they may produce a de[g]ree of 
conviction that overpowers inferences to 
be drawn from practical application by 
the parties. When such is the case, the 
court may say that when the meaning of 
the contract is plain and unambiguous, a 
different meaning will not be adopted on 
the basis of practical application by the 
parties. In saying this, however, the 
court should not mean that the words of 
the contract define themselves; instead, 
it should first consider carefully all the 
usual sources and methods of interpreta-
tion, including the practical interpreta-
tion of the parties. 
3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 558, at 
258 (footnote omitted). The State's accept-
ance of royalty payments based on the 
lower 15c-per-ton rate, as calculated by 
the plaintiffs, does not amount to knowl-
edge that the higher rate was applicable 
and does not prove that the State did not 
intend to apply the alternative rate provi-
sion. 
[13] The plaintiffs also claim that the 
alternative royalty provision was not self-
executing and placed no responsibility on 
them to calculate and pay the higher feder-
al rate without some affirmative action on 
the part of the State. The trial court 
agreed and held that the provision was 
"not self-executing as to create a legal 
obligation on the lessee " That conclu-
sion ignores the plain language of the 
lease. Article III of the lease states that 
the lessee "covenants and agrees" to pay 
whichever rate is higher. Further, under 
Article III, the lessees were required to 
prepare and forward a certified statement 
of the amount of production. The State did 
not instruct the plaintiffs to pay any specif-
ic amount or rate. Throughout the terms 
of the leases, the plaintiffs completed the 
royalty reporting form by filling out the 
column headed "c/T Basis" and leaving 
blank the column headed "Percentage Ba-
sis." Although the plaintiffs were initially 
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responsible for determining the proper roy-
alty rate and the total amount owed, those 
determinations are not binding on the 
State. This conclusion is supported by R. 
632-5-4 of the Utah Administrative Code 
(1990), which states: 'The division shall 
have the right at reasonable times and 
intervals to audit the books and records of 
any lessee . . . and to inspect the leased . . . 
premises and conduct field audits for the 
purpose of determining whether there has 
been compliance with the rules or the 
terms of agreement." 
In sum, the plaintiffs had the duty to 
determine whether the prevailing federal 
rate was higher and, if so, to pay at that 
rate. The alternative royalty provision did 
not require any affirmative action by the 
State. Summary judgment on this issue 
was inappropriate. 
III. ESTOPPEL 
The trial court ruled as a matter of law 
that the State was estopped from obtaining 
royalty payments at the prevailing federal 
rate. The court held that in entering the 
lease, the State acted in a proprietary ca-
pacity, that the doctrine of equitable estop-
pel applied against the State, and that even 
if the State were acting in a governmental 
capacity, it was still estopped because there 
was no substantial effect on public policy. 
The State argues that the facts do not 
support a finding of estoppel and that es-
toppel is not available when the State acts 
in its governmental capacity, as it asserts it 
did. Because the requirements of estoppel 
are not met, it is not necessary to decide 
whether the State acted in a governmental 
or proprietary capacity when leasing school 
trust lands. 
Generally, estoppel may not be asserted 
against the State. Utah State Univ. v. 
Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982). 
However, there is an exception to this rule 
"when its rigid application would defeat, 
2. In Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 
695, 697 (Utah 1976), also dealing with school 
trust lands, this Court stated: 
Estoppel arises when a party (defendant 
Board) by his acts, representations, or admis-
sions, or by his silence when he ought to 
speak, intentionally or through culpable negli-
rather than serve, the higher purpose that 
all rules are intended to serve: that of 
doing justice." Id. (footnote omitted) 
Thus, in "unusual circumstances," when 
the rule's "application would result in injus. 
tice, and there would be no substantial 
adverse effect on public policy, the courts 
will honor the higher purpose of doing jus-
tice by invoking the exception " /^ 
Under these circumstances, the State may 
be estopped even when it acts in its govern-
mental capacity. Celebrity Club, Inc. v. 
Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 
689, 694 (Utah 1979). 
The elements of estoppel are "(1) an ad-
mission, statement, or act inconsistent with 
the claim afterwards asserted, (2) action by 
the other party on the faith of such admis-
sion, statement, or act, and (3) injury to 
such other party resulting from allowing 
the first party to contradict or repudiate 
such admission, statement, or act/' Id. 
(citing West IK Dep't of Social and Health 
Services, 21 Wash.App. 577, 579, 586 P.2d 
516, 518 (1978)).2 "Estoppel is a doctrine 
of equity purposed to rescue from loss a 
party who has, without fault, been deluded 
into a course of action by the wrong or 
neglect of another." Morgan v. Board of 
State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976). 
[14-17] The State may not be estopped 
unless injustice would result and there 
would be no substantial adverse effect on 
public policy. There is no injustice in re-
quiring the plaintiffs to pay royalties at the 
prevailing federal rate when they knew 
that the lease required them to pay at the 
"prevailing" rate. Furthermore, it is im-
portant to consider that in administering 
the school trust lands, the State acts as a 
trustee and its duties are the same as the 
duties of other trustees. Department of 
State Lands v. PetUbone, 216 Mont. 361, 
702 P.2d 948, 953-54 (1985); Oklahoma 
Educ. Ass'n v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230, 235-36 
gence, induces another (plaintiffs) to believe 
certain facts to exist and that such other 
(plaintiffs) acting with reasonable prudence 
and diligence, relies and acts thereon so thai 
he will suffer an injustice if the former (Land 
Board) is permitted to deny the existence of 
such facts. 
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(Okla.1982); County of Skamania v. 
State, 102 Wash.2d 127, 132, 685 P.2d 576, 
5J,0 (1984). The State's duty of loyalty to 
the beneficiaries, see Restatement (Second) 
of Trusts § 170 (1959), includes the duty 
not to act in the interest of a third party at 
the expense of the beneficiaries by dispos-
ing of trust property for less than the 
agreed price. Id., comment q. The plain-
tiffs knew or should have known that the 
leased lands were trust lands, and they also 
knew that the lease required them to pay 
the prevailing federal rate when it was the 
higher rate. There is no injustice in requir-
ing them to pay the royalty required by the 
lease of the trust lands. 
[18] Furthermore, to estop the State 
would be to contravene the important pub-
lic policy that the State should recover full 
value from the lease of school trust land. 
In Lassen v. Arizona ex rel Arizona 
Highway Department, 385 U.S. 458, 466, 
ST S.Ct. 584, 588, 17 L.Ed.2d 515 (1967), the 
United States Supreme Court stated, in ref-
erence to school trust lands, that the state 
must "receive the full value of any lands 
transferred from it." Utah law also implic-
itly requires that the State obtain full value 
for leases of school trust land. Article XX, 
section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides 
that state public lands "shall be held in 
trust for the people, to be disposed of as 
may be provided b> law, for the respective 
purposes for which they have been . . . 
granted." In Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 
58 Utah 418, 433, 199 P. 670, 675 (1921), the 
Court stated that this constitutional provi-
sion is "an absolute limitation upon the 
power of the state to dispose of the lands, 
or permit them to be disposed of, except 
for the purpose for which they were grant-
ed by Congress." Section 6 of the En-
abling Act states the purpose for which 
these lands are granted, which is "for the 
support of common schools." If the State 
*ere estopped from obtaining full value for 
leases of school trust lands, the purpose of 
the trust lands could be undermined. For 
these reasons, the exception to the rule 
3
- This is not to sa\ that the prevailing federal 
rate provision of the state lease assures the 
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that the State may not be estopped is inap-
plicable under these circumstances. 
Furthermore, the elements of equitable 
estoppel have not been met. For an estop-
pel to arise, the State must have made an 
admission, statement, or act inconsistent 
with the position the State now takes. The 
State's acceptance of the lower rate is not 
inconsistent with the lease provision that 
the plaintiffs are required to pay at the 
higher of the two rates because the lessees 
themselves were responsible for determin-
ing the proper rate at which royalty pay-
ments were made. Moreover, it cannot be 
said on this record that the plaintiffs were 
without fault or even that they acted with 
reasonable prudence and diligence in ascer-
taining the correct rate to be paid. See 
Morgan, 549 P.2d at 697. 
The plaintiffs also argue that they would 
have suffered substantial losses from min-
ing under the State leases if they were 
required to pay at the 8% rate and that 
they would, therefore, have pursued other 
options had they known the State would 
require an 8% royalty payment. In enter-
ing into the leases, the plaintiffs were fully 
aware that the 15e-per-ton rate was not 
fixed for the term of the lease and that 
they had no guarantee against having to 
pay a higher royalty. 
[19] Furthermore, although the State 
asserts that it was entitled to an 8% royal-
ty, the federal regulations establishing roy-
alty rates for underground mining do not 
state that an 8% rate is necessarily re-
quired. See Coastal States Energy Co. v. 
Hodel, 816 F.2d 502, 507 (10th Cir.1987). 
Under the regulations, a royalty in a feder-
al coal lease could require less than an 8% 
rate if conditions exist making it impossible 
to operate a mine at a profit.3 On the 
other hand, the State asserts that of twen-
ty-three coal leases issued by the United 
States Bureau of Land Management on 
lands within the state of Utah between 
January 1, 1979, and December 31, 1985, 
eighteen required a royalty payment of 8%. 
The plaintiffs themselves held federal leas-
lessee of making a profit. 
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es requiring 87< royalties. Because the ap-
propriate rate is the prevailing federal rate 
for land of similar character, the issue of 
what that rate should be is to be deter-
mined by the trial court on remand. 
The conclusion that the State is not es-
topped from collecting additional royalties 
after accepting royalties at the lower rate 
is supported by case law from other juris-
dictions. See Foster v. Atlantic Refining 
Co., 329 F.2d 485, 490 (5th Cir.1964) 
("[Acceptance by the lessors of less royal-
ty than that to which they were entitled 
does not 'extinguish the entire debt nor 
work an estoppel.'" (quoting Arkansas 
Natural Gas Corp. v. Sartor, 98 F.2d 527, 
530 (5th Cir.1938))). See also Holmes v. 
Kewanee Oil Co., 233 Kan. 544, 550, 664 
P.2d 1335, 1341 (1983), cert, denied, A1A 
U.S. 953, 106 S.Ct. 322, 88 L.Ed.2d 305 
(1985); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 
S.W.2d 866, 875-76 (Tex.1968). An inter-
esting comparison may be made to federal 
mineral and gas leases, under which accept-
ance of royalties is made subject to subse-
quent audit. See Arch Mineral Corp. v. 
Lujan, 911 F.2d 408, 411 (10th Cir.1990); 
Shell Offshore Inc., 115 IBLA 205, 211 
(July 3, 1990). Although no language in 
the leases at issue specifically makes the 
leases subject to subsequent audit, the 
leases are implicitly subject to such a limi-
tation by virtue of the acknowledged right 
of the State to audit the books and records 
of the plaintiffs to determine compliance 
with the leases. Utah Admin.Code R. 632-
5-4 (1990). 
[20] Although the State's acceptance of 
royalty payments at the lower rate is not a 
sufficient ground for invoking the doctrine 
of estoppel, there may be additional facts 
which could justify estoppel against the 
State. For example, Plateau, or more spe-
cifically its co-plaintiff and purchaser Cy-
prus, asserts that the state audit had un-
covered the deficiency in royalty payments, 
but the State nevertheless assured Cyprus 
that the lease was in good standing. Pla-
teau claims that Cyprus, relying on that 
4. The State also claims that the plaintiffs were 
not entitled to rely on the unauthorized or erro-
neous statements of government employees. 
assurance, consummated the purchase of 
Plateau three months after the audit had 
been completed. The State, on the other 
hand, argues that representations that the 
lease was in good standing had no applies 
tion to the amount of royalty to be paid4 
The State also argues that Cyprus and 
Plateau knew that the lease required pay-
ment at the higher of the two rates and 
knew that they were dealing with school 
trust land. Furthermore, it is possible that 
Plateau and Cyprus made arrangements 
for such a contingency in their purchase 
agreement. If so, this may have some 
bearing on the issue of estoppel against the 
State. Although summary judgment on 
the issue of estoppel was improper, the 
plaintiffs might be able to present evidence 
at trial which would support a finding of 
estoppel. This is an issue to be determined 
by the trial court. 
[21] Plateau and Blackhawk also argue 
that the State waived its right to enforce 
the alternative royalty provision. Al-
though the issue of waiver was presented 
to the trial court, it did not rule on the 
issue. We state the law here for guidance 
to the trial court in deciding this issue on 
remand. " 'A waiver is the intentional re-
linquishment of a known right.' " Ameri-
can Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blomquist, 21 
Utah 2d 289, 292, 445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968) 
(quoting Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 90 
Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d 308, 311 (1936)). 
Mere silence is not a waiver unless there is 
some duty or obligation to speak. Dalton 
v. LeBlanc, 350 F.2d 95, 98-99 (10th Cir. 
1965). 
[22] The State's acceptance of royalty 
payments in amounts less than the amount 
owed does not mean that the State waived 
its right to full payment. In Holmes, the 
Kansas Supreme Court stated that accept-
ance by a lessor of an amount "less than 
was owed under the terms of the leases" 
did not constitute a waiver. 233 Kan. at 
550, 664 P.2d at 1341. "This issue has 
been resolved in the royalty owners' favor 
on numerous occasions." Id. We agree 
The trial court did not consider this issue, and 
we do not address it on appeal. 
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that the State has not impliedly waived its 
right to a higher royalty by acceptance of 
the lesser royalty for a period when the 
higher royalty should have been paid. 
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
[23] Plateau, Consolidation, and Black-
hawk argue on appeal that the State's in-
terpretation of the lease is essentially a 
new royalty policy and that the State can-
not adopt such a policy unless it complies 
with the procedures of the Utah Adminis-
trative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46a-l to -16 (1986). The trial court 
did not address this issue, although the 
three plaintiffs raised it below. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-2(8)(a) (1986) 
(currently § 63-46a-2(14) (Supp.1990)) pro-
vided: 
"Rule" means a statement made by an 
agency that applies to a general class of 
persons, rather than specific persons 
and: (i) implements or interprets policy 
made by statute; or (ii) prescribes the 
policy of the agency in the absence of 
express statutory policy; or (iii) pre-
scribes the administration of the agen-
cy's functions or describes its organiza-
tion, procedures, and operations. "Rule" 
includes the amendment or repeal of an 
existing rule. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3(4) (1986) (cur-
rently § 63-46a-3(4) (1989)) provided: 
Rulemaking is not required when: 
(a) a procedure or standard is already 
described in statute; 
(b) agency action affects an individual 
person, not a class of persons; 
(c) agency action applies only to inter-
nal agency procedures; or 
(d) grammatical or other insignificant 
nile changes do not affect agency policy 
or the application or results of agency 
actions. 
The State's interpretation and attempted 
application of the lease provision at issue 
does not amount to rulemaking. See 
Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 
p
-2d 773, 776-77 (Utah 1986). A compari-
son to federal law is useful on this point. 
Jn Shell Offshore lnc.t 115 IBLA 205 (July 
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3, 1990), the Minerals Management Service 
(MMS) had prepared a procedure paper set-
ting out criteria by which royalties were to 
be calculated from oil and gas leases. Ac-
cording to an audit conducted pursuant to 
these criteria, Shell owed additional royal-
ties for the years 1980-83. "Shell . . . ar-
gued that the Procedure Paper was improp-
erly accorded retroactive effect, especially 
where it represented a departure from 
MMS' previous acceptance of Shell's report-
ed prices over a period of many years " 
Id. at 208. In response to Shell's argu-
ment, the administrative judge stated: "On 
numerous occasions we have reviewed and 
rejected arguments that application of the 
Procedure Paper constituted a retroactive 
application of a new rule." Id. at 210. 
Although federal administrative law does 
not control the resolution of the issue, that 
law is helpful. In the present case, the 
State simply seeks to rely on a known lease 
provision. The determination that a specif-
ic lease provision is enforceable is not rule-
making. 
V. LACHES 
[24,25] Blackhawk argues that the 
State is barred from recovery by the doc-
trine of laches. The trial court did not 
decide this issue, but it was raised below by 
Blackhawk. Laches bars a recovery when 
there has been a delay by one party caus-
ing a disadvantage to the other party. Pa-
panikolas Bros. Enters, v. Sugarhouse 
Shopping Center Assocs.f 535 P.2d 1256, 
1260 (Utah 1975). Laches has two ele-
ments: (1) lack of diligence on the part of 
the claimant and (2) an injury to the defen-
dant because of the lack of diligence. Id. 
at 1260. The State argues that it did not 
pursue this matter because it was the les-
sees' duty to pay the proper royalty. Lach-
es is inapplicable in this case; it was Black-
hawk that defaulted in the performance of 
its duty. 
VI. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Blackhawk also argues briefly that the 
State is barred from recovery on this claim 
by the statute of limitations. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-23(2) (1987) provides that an 
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action on a written contract must be 
brought within six years. The trial court 
did not address this argument, and we de-
cline to address it on appeal. At most, this 
argument would excuse a few months of 
delinquent royalty provisions. We leave 
this question to the trial court to consider. 
VII. INTEREST AND PENALTIES 
[26] The State's audit of the leases 
claimed charges for delinquent interest and 
penalties for failing to pay the proper roy-
alty. The trial court did not allow charges 
because of its holding that the State could 
not recover any delinquent payments, but 
also gave other reasons why the State 
could not recover interest and penalties. 
Our reversal may affect the trial court's 
analysis of this issue, and we leave the 
matter for the trial court's determination. 
We reverse the summary judgments in 
favor of Plateau, Blackhawk, Consolida-
tion, and Trail Mountain and remand for 
further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, A.C.J., and 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Michael R. MOORE, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 890558-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 8, 1990. 
Defendant was convicted of eight 
counts of securities fraud following jury 
trial in the Eighth District Court, Duches 
County, Allen B. Sorensen, J. Defendant 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Green-
wood, J., held that: (1) five-year statute of 
limitations contained in Securities Act ap-
plied; (2) evidence was sufficient to sun-
port defendant's convictions; and (3) crimi-
nal defendants challenging sufficiency of 
evidence following jury verdicts will be re-
quired to marshal the evidence. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <§=>147 
Five-year statute of limitations set 
forth in Securities Act applied to defen-
dant's criminal prosecution for securities 
fraud, rather than four-year general felony 
limitation period. U.C.A.1953, 61-1-21, 76-
1-103(1), 76-1-302(1). 
2. Statutes e=>223.4 
Limitation periods contained within 
specific statutes control over those of more 
general statutes. 
3. Criminal Law <s=>147 
Statute of limitations included in same 
act which defines a crime applies to that 
crime unless otherwise clearly provided. 
4. Criminal Law 01144.13(3, 5), 1159.2(7) 
Court of Appeals will reverse jury's 
guilty verdict on ground that evidence was 
insufficient to support conviction only if 
evidence, along with reasonable inferences 
from evidence viewed in light most favor-
able to verdict, is so inconclusive or inher-
ently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted; jury, not appellate 
court, weighs evidence and assesses wit-
ness credibility, and so long as some evi-
dence and reasonable inferences support 
jury's findings, Court of Appeals will not 
disturb them. 
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AG.-ZZXZXT OF SUHLEASE 
THIS AGREEMENT, mace as of th i s 13th day of August, ^ 
19 79, by and between: 
INEZ LOU FETTEROLF, Executrix of the Estate of Myron F. Fetterolf , 
of Somerset County, Pennsylvania, hereinafter referred to as 
"the E s t a t e , " 
N 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, a Utah corporation, doing business 
w i th in the s t a t e of Utah, here inafter referred t o as "Trail 
Mountain. " 
W I T N E S S E T H T H A T : 
, DEFENDANT'S 
/ WHEREAS, on August 13, 19 79, Myron F. Fetterolf acquired 
I Utah State Coal Lease No7T2603 and on that date entered into an 
\ oral sublease of his rights under said Lease to Trail Mountain 
2 Coal Company which oral sublease was documented in writing by 
/ legal counsel on November 9, 19 79, but was not signed by Myron 
\F. Fetterolf prior to his death on June 9, 1980; and 
WHEREAS, the Estate has now succeeded Myron F. Fetterolf 
as the owner of the aforesaid Lease; and 
WHEREAS, the Estate and Trail Mountain now deem it 
advisable to execute this Agreement of Sublease which contains 
all the same terms of the document provided by counsel on 
November 9, 19 79; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Estate hereby sublets to Trail 
Mountain, and Trail Mountain hereby sublets from the Estate, its 
successors and assigns, the right to mine coal from that 640 
acre parcel described as Section 36, Township 17 South, Range 
6 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Emery County, Utah and 
such other rights which the Estate has under Utah State Coal 
Lease No. 22603, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 
and hereby made a part hereof (the "Premises"), under the following 
terms and conditions: 
1. Term. The term of the subleasing of the Premises 
shall be for the term stated in Exhibit 1, and is intended to 
continue until all of the coal in the Premises is mined to 
exhaustion; provided; however, that the Estate shall have the 
right to cancel the sublease in the event that Trail Mountain 
becomes insolvent, bankrupt, or is in breach of its obligation 
to pay royalties, or is in breach of other such obligations as 
are provided below in paragraph 8. 
2. Tonnage Royalties. Trail Mountain shall pay to 
the Estate and its successors and assions commencing as of 
August 13, 1979, for each and every ton (2,000 pounds) of raw coal 
renoved from the Premises a tonnage royalty, computed at eight 
^ (8) percent of the net selling price ot the coal at the mine site, 
trucking costs excluded. Payment is due by-the twenty-fifth 
(25th) day following the month of sale or transportation of 
such coal away from the site, whichever occurs first, and should 
be eccc.Tpcr.ied by a correct statement of the quantity of coal 
rer.cvei, along with such supporting documentation as is appropri-
ate. All costs of production other than trucking costs are to 
be bczr.e solely by Trail Mountain, and are not to be included in 
computing the net selling price, and the tonnage royalty due 
thereon. 
3. Richt of Inspection. The Estate, its agent, or 
any employee acting on its behalf, shall have the right during 
business hours to enter the site and workings of Trail Mountain 
for any reasonable purpose, and for the particular purpose of 
ascertaining the amounts of coal removed from the Premises. 
4. Terms and Conditions of Underlying Lease Bindino. 
The subleasehoia granted hereunder by the Estate to Trail " 
Mountain is subject to the terms and conditions of the under-
lying lease held by the Estate from the State of Utah, a copy 
of which is attached as Exhibit 1, except to the extent that 
obligations thereunder or conditions thereof are enlarged in 
favor of the Estate by this sublease, in which case Trail 
Mountain is bound by the terms and conditions contained herein. 
4.1. Trail Mountain agrees to pay all royalties or 
other charges due on the underlying lease between the Estate and 
the State of Utah, to the State of Utah, the United States, or 
any other party to whom such royalties are owing to the full 
extent of such obligation, including any minimum annual payment 
required, as it becomes due, and all per ton royalty charges, 
at "a rate then being in effect. Payments under this paragraph 
4.1 shall not reduce or otherwise affect the royalty to be 
paid under paragraph 2 of this sublease. 
4.2. Trail Mountain shall furnish to the Estate 
periodic statements demonstrating Trail Mountain's compliance 
with its obligation to make royalty payments on the underlying 
lease, and compliance with similar such obligations. 
5. Indemnification of the Estate. It is distinctly 
understood and agreed by Trail Mountain that it alone is 
responsible for any and all costs and liabilities incurred in 
its mining operations on the leased premises, and Trail Mountain 
hereby releases and forever discharges the Estate, its succes-
sors and assigns from all damages and liability for damages 
from water, gas or other causes whatsoever that might be or 
would be done by the mining operations of Trail Mountain. Trail 
Mountain agrees to indemnify the Estate and its successors and 
assigns from any and all loss, damage, cost, charge or expense, 
whether direct or indirect, and whether to persons or property, 
to which the Estate and its successors and assigns may be 
subjected by reason of any action, omission, or default of Trail 
Mountain or any of Trail Mountain's contractors, subcontractors, 
or any of its ox its contractor's or subcontractor's officers, 
agents or employees. 
6. Insurance. Trail Mountain agrees to carry liability 
insurance covering its mining operations on the leased premises, 
and to furnish the Estate with a certificate of its agent showing 
such to be in force. Said insurance shall have limits of at 
least $250,000 for any one person and $500,000 for any one 
accident for personal injury, and limit of at least $250,000 for 
* 
prc?*rv/ car.2ce. Trail Mountain shall see that such coverage 
renins in fcrce for the duration of any leaseholds granted* 
hereunder. 
7. Taxes. Trail Mountain shall pay as additional 
renatl, all taxes, levies, assessments or other charges in the 
nature thereof, imposed by the State of Utah or any political 
subdivision thereof, as to surface lands, upon any improvements 
made by Trail Mountain thereon or upon equipment used upon the-
Premises, and as to coal lanes, any and all rfcal estate, severance 
or other taxes upon coal in place, or as removed, which-.may be 
attributable thereto. Further, Trail Mountain shall pay any 
taxes imposed by'the Federal, state or any local government on 
production of coal where such taxes are based on the number*pf 
tons of coal produced, used, transferred or sold, etc., including 
without limitation, the Federal reclamation fees and the Federal 
black lung excise tax. 
8* Default. In the event Trail Mountain fails to 
make payment of any tonnage royalty installment-due hereunder, 
any other payment due hereunder, or should it become insolvent 
or bankrupt, or should it attempt to assign away" i^ ts* ri"ghts 
under this sublease, it shall be in default and the Estate shall 
have the option to declare this sublease cancelled, and reenter 
and take control of the Premises, and/or seek its legal remedy^ 
as necessary. 
9. Binding Effect. This Agreement shall be binding 
upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and 
their respective successors and assigns. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOE, the parties have caused this Agree-
ment to be signed this ^ ^/A£ay of January, 19 81, effective as 
of August 13, 1979. 
WITNESS: ESTATE OF MYRON F. FETTEROLF 
~*~ Inez Lp6 F e t t e r o l f , F ~ 
Executrix 
MTTEST: TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY 
cLC SAL 
Lnthony/JA. Da le s sandro , Lou i s T. F i o r i , Pr< 
_(SEAL) 
Louis T. Fiori, President 
Secretary 
cc.c::r:i.-_TH or PISXSYLVAXIA ) 
cs:-~v OT SOKESSZ? 
) ssi 
) 
On the ^ i?ffday of January, 19 81, personally appeared 
before roe Inez Lou Fetterolf, Executrix of the Estate of Myron 
f. Fetterolf, signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledced 
to roe that she executed the same for and on behalf of said 
MV Commission Expires: 
J
 WRZJ KJ19Y. NOU&r PUBLIC 
SOMERSET TWF. S0V£RS£T COUNTY 
M COMMISSION EXPIRES KAR 3. 1983 
Notary Public J* \ 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ) 
) SS: 
COUNTY OF SOMERSET ) 
On this of January, 19 81, personally appeared 
before roe Louis TTFlori and Anthony A. Dalessandro, who being 
duly sworn did say, each for himself, that they are the designated 
officers of Trail Mountain Coal Company, a Utah corporation, 
and are authorized to execute this Agreement and have executed 
the sme for and on behalf of said corporation. 
Hy expromission E x p i r e s : 
time* KIIBT. wo:;ar PUBLIC 
SOMERSET TWF, SOMERSET COUNTY 
MY CGW.SS'GN IXMIS 1M. 3. 13B3 
l^ rmbtr. Ptir.S|tor.ij tacrilo of Motorics 
Notary Public /" J 
